Tag: Demographics

  • Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States

    Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States


     

    Americans


    SUMMARY

     

    Population projections and demographic changes, especially in the different age cohorts, should be seen along with large annual fiscal

    deficits and the large and increasing national debt. The connection is the forecasts of large increases in the over-65 age group and the shrinking working age (and tax-paying) age group. 

    This essay should be read along with Government Finance 101. Fiscal Policy:  Welcome to Alice in Wonderland. 


    UPDATE (November 2025)


    Combining the recent changes in the birth rate and net

    immigration, plus the “baked-in” projection that Americans over the age of 65 will increase by about 50 million by 2060 (see below), it seems likely that the number of Americans in the working ages  cohort (15-64) will decrease at least 40 million by 2060. From about 230 million in 2025 to 190 million in 2060. Well before then, it seems likely that America, like other wealthy countries, will have extensive temporary worker permit programs to augment the native-born work force. This will probably be combined with much more extensive use of generative AI algorithms to handle much of the information analysis in organizations combined with greatly increased use of industrial robots.


    UPDATE (October 2025)


    Projections are changing rapidly because of the dramatic change in net immigration and a slight but continuous fall in the birth rate. Past long run projections, assuming historic levels of immigration, now seem high.


    In January, the CBO’s projections  showed “without immigration the population would shrink beginning in 2033” if birth rates stayed at current low levels. Without immigration, the CBO now expects the US population to start shrinking in 2031. If there is net negative immigration – more deportations and immigrants leaving the US – CBO projections indicate that the population may reach zero growth as early as around 2028. 


    At least half of immigrants, about 6 million, have entered the country in the last four years with some protection from immediate deportation, especially under asylum status. This protection is being withdrawn, even from immigrants who have been granted asylum status in the past.


    There are some estimates that the total immigration population of the US is falling, about 1.5 million over the last year. This may indicate net negative immigration.


    Since immigrants tend to be young adults and have a higher birth rate than the US-born population, lower levels of immigration, mass deportations, and voluntary leaving of immigrants could lower the projected birth rates.


    UPDATE (September 2025)


    The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has updated its population projections based on a lower birth rate and lower net immigration. “The CBO projects that the U.S. population will increase from 350 million in 2025 to 367 million in 2055. Deaths will be greater than births starting around 2031; the gap gets larger over time. So all population growth after 2031 will be from net immigration. If net immigration falls to zero, the U.S. population will stop growing in 2031 and start a slow decrease after then.



    UPDATE (August 2025)


    Recent data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention show the U.S. birth rate has fallen below 1.6, the lowest rate on record. With a falling birth rate, far fewer legal and illegal immigrants and increasing deportations, the United States is now on the same demographic falling population path as most other industrialized and industrializing countries. 


         Reported in The Economist, “America’s fertility crash reaches                                                                                               a new low,” August 5, 2025.

    OVERVIEW OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES 

    The longer-run projection is a population of about 335 million people in 2100 (Lancet), about the same number as today. This projection was made with data up to 2017. There is a very wide range of uncertainty around this projection, partly depending on future birth rates and levels of immigration.

     

    The U.S. birth rate is a little over 1.6, below the replacement level of 2.1. This is in line with some industrialized countries but higher than Japan, China, South Korea, and most European countries. If the birth rate stays about the same and there is little or no net immigration, the Lancet projection is too high. The U.S. maximum population may occur much sooner.


    According to the Census Bureau, by 2030, one in five Americans will be 65 or older, which is up from less than one in 10 in 1960.


    By 2060, the Population Reference Bureau expects the number of Americans 65 and older to more than double from 46 million today to over 98 million.


    In less than two decades, older adults are set to outnumber kids for the first time in US history.



    Because of demographics, the United States could have a relatively better economic future than almost any other industrial or industrializing country. Almost all these countries will experience declining populations (if levels of immigration do not substantially increase), many with population decreases of 30-50%. Also, most of these countries will have higher dependency ratios (a higher percent of old people) than the U.S. That is, the U.S. will have a relatively younger population. This is partly due to higher birth rates and high rates of immigration into the U.S. since the 1960s. With the current birth rate, the United States will reach maximum population later than the other industrial or developing countries.

     

    DEMOGRAPHICS OF AMERICA:  POPULATION PROJECTIONS

     

    For generations, demographers considered America exceptional. High levels of immigration and relatively high fertility rates increased its population faster, and kept it more youthful, then its rich country peers in Europe. Americans within their borders were also exceptionally mobile.

     

    America has had high population growth rates since the first immigrants. (For a detailed look at immigration in colonial times, see American Colonial History, 1607-1775) Since becoming a country, America’s population has gone from 4 million in 1790 (the first census) to 30 million in 1860 to the current (7/24) population of 343 million. The main reasons for America’s high population growth rates in the past have been high birth rates, immigration, relatively healthy and well-fed population, and industrialization (economic development and growth).

     

    The period from 1950 to 2000 was unusual. 

     

    Population during this period was:

     

     

    Year

    Population

    Millions

    Decade

    Increase

    Millions

    Decade

    % Increase

     

    1950

    152

     

     

     

    1960

    176

    24

    16%

     

    1970

    200

    24

    12

     

    1980

    223

    23

    12

     

    1990

    248

    25

    11

     

    2000

    282

    34

    14

     

    2010

    311

    29

    10

     

    2020

    339

    28

      9

     

     

    United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,

    World Population Prospects, The 2024 Revisions

     

    Between 1950 and 2000, the U.S. population almost doubled. The American “baby boom” started after World War II, temporarily reversing the long-term decline in birth rates. In the middle of this period, partly due to more effective and more available birth control, starting around 1970, birth rates began a rapid decline. That was partly offset by an increase in immigration.

     

    Since 2000, population growth rates have slowed. The 2020-2030 population growth rates will probably be lower, maybe around 6% for the decade, because of Covid, lower birth rates, and lower net migration rates (fewer immigrants and more past migrants leaving the United States).

     

    The U.S. population at the beginning of 2024 was 343 million.

     

    The UN projection continues:

     

    2040 – 370 million

    2050 – 381 million

    2070s – 400 million

    2100 –  421 million


    The projected population in 2050 is only 11 million higher than 2040, a decade increase of only 3%. It is also 38 million people higher than 2024, an average increase of about 4-5% per decade.

    After the 2070, the U.S. population will increase by less than one million per year. (United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2024 Revision.) These projections are high and like past United Nations projections will probably be lower in the future.

     

     

    The alternative projection from Lancet expects the U.S. population to peak at 365 million in 2062 and then decline to 335 million in 2100, about the same number as today.

     

    There is a very wide range of uncertainty around this projection, depending on future birth rates and levels of immigration. These projections were made from a starting point of higher birth rates and higher immigration numbers before Covid and current immigration and deportation policies. Birth rates have not returned to pre-Covid levels.

     

    The U.S. birth rate has been around or slightly below replacement since 1975. The current (2024) U.S. birth rate at 1.62 is the lowest since records began in 1909. The population growth rate is 0.5% a year is low and falling. The 2025 population growth rate is expected to be around 0.2%.


    About half of the decline in the birth rate since 1990 has been due to fewer teenage pregnancies.

     

    Without past immigration and the children of immigrants, the U.S. population and labor force growth rate would have been lower in the past 40 years. And more of the total growth would have been in the over-65 age group. Immigrants tend to be young adults. If net immigration is zero or below, America’s birth rate will continue to fall.

     

    The over-65 population is expected to double in the next 35 years, from 46 million now to over 98 million in 2060. (Population Reference Bureau) All of the total population increase will be in the over-65 group; the number of people under 65 will decline. This will increase the ratio of the over-65 age group to the prime labor force age group of 18-64. Again, depending on immigration, since immigrants tend to be younger than the native population.

     

    Like other industrialized countries, older adults are expected to outnumber children (under 18) in less than two decades. (Population Reference Bureau) 

     

    The current birth rate is now about the same or slightly higher than that of many industrial countries. This might be partly due to the effects of Covid, although the current birth rate is the same as the birth rate during the Covid years of 2020-2022. But because of past immigration and its demographic effects, the long run decline in America’s population and the labor force should be less than most other industrialized countries.

     

    The partial abortion ban will have little effect on future population growth. The number of abortions was going down even before the ban. Abortions are still legal in many states. Abortion pills accounted for over half of abortions before the ban. In Europe, pills account for about 70% of abortions.

     

    The United States has a special problem. Because of the opioid/fentanyl epidemic and suicide, America’s adult mortality rate is increasing, mostly among white men under 55. A 15-year-old white male’s probability of dying before the age of 50 is now higher in America than in Bangladesh. The good news is that while still high, deaths from opioids and fentanyl are going down. The bad news is that a new, more powerful drug than fentanyl has begun to show up.

     

      

    ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FUTURE SIZE OF THE LABOR FORCE

     

    With birth rates below replacement, the future size of the labor force will depend critically on immigration. Future productivity increases will partly depend on immigrants’ young age composition, birth rate, and education and training.

     

    The current (2024/25) unemployment rate is near a post-World War II low. The labor crunch is likely to persist for some time. The Pew Research Center projects no or very little growth in the working-age population over the next two decades. If the United States were to cut off the flow of new immigrants, Pew noted, the American working-age population would shrink.

     

    The U.S. economy is growing at about 2-2½ percent a year. Employment is growing at about 1.0-1.5% a year; productivity is growing at about one percent a year. The size of the labor force (employed plus unemployed) is growing at about 0.3% per year; the growth rate is in long-term decline and may accelerate with a possible decrease of immigrant workers. This indicates that the growth in employment will probably be lower in the future than in the past.


    The US youth (16-24 years old) labor force participation rate is dropping. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that only 53.1% of young people (ages 16-24) were employed during the summer of 2025, about 15 percentage points less than in 2000. This might also lead to delayed marriages and family formation. This could affect the demand for housing.


    This is puzzling. The minimum wage is much higher. College graduates have large amounts of student loan debt. Both of these should indicate higher labor force participation rates. But currently (second half of 2025), companies, based with uncertainty due to randomly changing tariffs, higher interest rates, and uncertainty about future consumption expenditures, are not hiring new entrants to the labor force.


    One possibility is that traditional employers of young people, such as restaurants, are cutting back on total employment and also substituting automation. 


    Periods of high youth dropping out and unemployment are historically correlated with increases in social instability, drug use, crime, and political extremism. 


        Ed D’Agostino, “Unemployment’s Slow Burn,” October 10, 2025.

    There’s another variable, one highlighted in The Wall Street Journal. Suzy Welch wrote an important commentary based on her research on Gen Z at NYU Stern School of Business. This group was born between 1997 and 2012, making them 13 to 28 years old today. Welch, former editor of the Harvard Business Review, took a look at Gen Z’s values. She found a stark disconnect between their values and those sought by today’s businesses.


    Welch reports that only about 2% of Gen Z prioritize the values most employers seek—achievement, learning, and a strong drive to work. Instead, Gen Z places higher value on selfcare, authenticity, and helping others—commendable values on their own, but when they are your top priorities, you might find it hard to thrive at work.

    Another possible source of disconnect of the young is the addictive attraction of the internet, especially video games, for males. Some researchers believe this is also the reason that male academic achievement is below female achievement and the gap is widening.


    Combined with the high use of illegal drugs, these factors might help explain the dropout rate and lack of traditional values.  

     

    Most of the recent increase in the size of the labor force has been in the over-55 age group. This is the fastest growing age group and more older Americans are living longer, healthier, and working past retirement age. Also, millions of Americans own small businesses and apparently do not automatically retire just because they turn 65. Others have technical skills (tax accountants, dentists, various types of data analysts) that allow them to continuing working, often part-time or online.


    There has been little increase in total employment in the under-55 age group. There are studies that suggest an aging labor force causes slower productivity growth. Also, possibly, less innovation. This may be a factor in the decline of new business formation.

     

    Like other wealthy countries, economic growth will depend on productivity increases. Productivity growth in the ten years of this economic expansion (since 2009, before Covid) was the lowest for any ten-year period since the end of World War II. It is possible, however, that government statistics are not picking up the productivity increases from innovations in information technology.

     

    DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION

     

    The following report from 2015 shows how important immigration has been from the 1960s to the date of the report. This is in contrast to the situation since Covid and the Trump campaign against immigration.


    According to a 2015 Pew Research Center report, “Immigrants and their children will represent 36 percent of the U.S. population in 2065, which equals or surpasses the peak levels last seen around the turn of the 20th century. That share will represent a doubling since 1965 (18 percent) and a notable rise from today’s 26 percent.” Pew estimates that as of March 2025, immigrants and their U.S.-born children comprise about 28% of the U.S. population, totaling over 93 million people. These projections are now in doubt because of the drastic reduction of immigrants seeking permanent residence.

     

    The report states that “the arrival of new immigrants and the births of their children and grandchildren accounted for 55 percent of the U.S. population increase since 1964…The projections also show that 88 percent of the increase in population until 2065 is linked to future immigrants and their descendants.”

     

    Over the last two decades, immigrants and their children accounted for more than half the growth of the population of 25- to 64-year-olds, according to the Pew analysis. Over the next 20 years, immigrants and their children will have to make up for the net deficit in the labor force left by the retirement of the baby boom generation. If immigration were to continue at recent levels, around 2050 the United States would have the lowest percent of retirement-age population of any developed country. Even lower than China. This means more tax-paying workers per retired person than any other industrialized country.

     

    Immigration over the last 50 years has impacted American demographics. The American population continues to grow despite below replacement birthrates of native-born inhabitants. Immigrants tend to be young, increasing the size of the workforce and slowing the increase of the average age of the population. The education and skills they bring is a “free lunch” for the American economy. A high percent of Americans who have won Nobel prizes were immigrants or the children of immigrants.

     

    Immigrants and their children have traditionally provided a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs. “Immigrants start companies at twice the rate of native Americans. Almost half the companies in the Fortune 500 were started by immigrants or their children.” (Austan Goolsbee, “Sharp Cuts in Immigration Threaten U.S. Economy,” New York Times Sunday Business, October 13, 2019, 4). One of the founders of Google was from Russia. The current CEOs of Microsoft and Google are from India and the CEOs of Nvidia and AMD are from Taiwan. 

     

    IMMIGRATION POLICY AND STATISTICS

     

    Currently, there are 9 million people in the United States with green cards, which means they are on a path to citizenship. During the Biden administration, about 3.5 million people became naturalized citizens, almost one million a year. (New York Times, “Immigrants are Becoming U.S. Citizens at Fastest Clip in Years,” August 12, 2024, From the photos in the article, it appears a high percent are young people.) 

     

    America has an estimated 11-14 million illegal immigrants. But this is more complicated than the political rhetoric and sensationalist journalism indicates. Many would have eventually attain some type of legal status leading to permanent residence; less now because of deportations and blocking the part to residence and citizenship.

     

    The United States does not have a coherent immigration policy. The last immigration law was passed in 1990. Attempts to modernize immigration policy has been stymied because of difference between Democrats and Republicans.

     

    The Trump administration reduced legal immigration and plans to make it difficult for foreign, especially Chinese, students to attend American colleges. In the past, foreign students who remained in the United States were a major source of scientists, technology workers and entrepreneurs. Over half of the science, math and engineering graduate students in the U.S. are from foreign countries.

     

    Discouraging immigration, limiting foreign work visas, and foreign graduate students will reduce major sources of American innovation, technology entrepreneurs, and productivity growth in the future. It will also eliminate the major source of the overall growth in the labor force. 

     

    DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

     

    Immigration over the last 50 years has impacted American demographics. The American population continues to grow despite below replacement birth rates of native-born inhabitants. Immigrants tend to be young, increasing the size of the workforce. The education and skills they bring is a “free lunch” for the American economy. On the other hand, the increasing number of older Americans will make it difficult to reduce yearly deficits and fund programs for economic growth.


    The changing demographics of the United States may be influencing other variables besides economic growth. Changing demographics might interact in the future with changing social

    attitudes, global warming and how to combat it, and America’s foreign policy.

     

    POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

     

    Immigration since 1960 has changed the ethnic and racial composition of America. Latinos make up about 20% of American population; Asians about 10%. There are about twice as many Latinos than blacks; there are almost as many Asians as blacks. This will change the influence of minority groups. (New York Times, February 22, 2021).

     

    The continuing change in the age distribution of the population will have political and economic consequences. For example, when the Social Security trust fund runs out around 2034 (maybe earlier), benefits will drop by at least 20%. With seniors on Social Security making up a large minority of voters, the government will probably make up the shortfall out of general tax revenue. This could increase federal yearly deficits or there would be less money for other programs.

     

    Fewer taxpayers in the future will have to support the greatly increased public health care costs of an aging population living longer.

     

    It could be that the United States will have a better economic future than almost any other country because of demographics. That partly depends on future immigration policies. And there probably will be internal political conflict over the distribution of income by age group.

    SUMMARY

     

    With labor force growth rates falling and productivity not increasing, the labor force aging, and legal immigration restricted, long-term U.S. economic growth rates may be lower in the future – below 2% – than currently. Increases in per capita income will depend on productivity increases from new technology, including the widespread application of robotics, new business software, artificial intelligence, and technology developed in the future. It is too early to predict what the long-run impact of artificial intelligence will be on economic growth and employment.


     

     

    SOURCES:


    S.E. Vollcet et. al., “Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study,” Lancet, July 14, 2020, 1285-1306. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(20)30677-2.

     

    Probably the best estimates of long-run population projections. Also includes “uncertainty internals” (two standard deviations from mean estimate). They become wider the further out the projection.

     

    United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,

    World Population Prospects, The 2024 Revisions

    The United Nations population projections used here are the most recent “medium,” most likely projections. They are lower than the UN projections made two years earlier. It is likely that future UN projections will revise population numbers downward.


    Pew Research Center

     

    Particularly strong on immigration data and analysis

     

    United States Census Bureau (census.gov)

    Statistica

    Population Reference Bureau

    Worldometer (for current figures)

    Numerous articles in The Economist


    Again, population projection and demographic changes should be thought of in connection with government deficits:


    Government Finance 101. Fiscal Policy:  Welcome to Alice in Wonderland.


    For population projections and analysis for Japan and the world, see

    Demographics and Population Projections of Japan


    In contrast to the United States and other countries, Japan is further along the declining population and labor force curve than almost any other country and may be a preview of the future of many countries outside of Africa. Japan has the world’s oldest population. There is limited but rising immigration, which has triggered a political backlash.


    For an analysis of global demographics and long-run population projections, see


    Global Demographics and Population Projections


    Demographics and Economic Growth


    For a look at current global and American use of industrial and humanoid robots, see


    Robots. “It’s Alive.”

    Includes some (hopefully) satirical comments about the future use of robots.

      

  • Nigeria

    Nigeria

     

    Lagos – Over 30 Million People 


    POPULATION

    This case study of Nigeria, building on


    Global Demographics and Population Projections

    illustrates the problems that recently-independent countries, especially in Africa, have had. Rapid population growth has made it difficult to deal with these problems in the past; continued large population growth in the future will be even more burdensome. 

    Nigeria became independent in 1960. Its population was 45 million people. In 2024 its population was 233 million people. Nigeria’s capital, Lagos, is already one of the largest cities in the world. In 2050 its projected population will be in the range of 375-400 million people, depending on how fast its birth rate continues to come down. Around that year Nigeria will replace the United States as the third most populous country in the world. 

     

    By 2100, Nigeria is projected to have at least 750 million people, which will be about equal to the projected population of China.

     

    Nigeria’s birth rate in 2023 was 4.5, substantially higher than the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. Although the birth rate is down from the high of 6.9 in 1979, it is still one of the highest in the world. Government programs to reduce the birth rate are part of health care programs, which are being cut back because the stopping of U.S. aid for health care, which includes birth control programs.

     

    ECONOMY

    This forms the backdrop for discussing Nigeria’s current problems and prospects for economic growth and development. One conclusion is obvious: Nigeria will need very high and sustained economic growth rates to overcome the rapid increase in population and increase the country’s real per capita income. 

     

    Nigeria’s economy still depends on oil; Nigeria is a major oil exporter. Real per capita income goes up and down with the price of oil. Economic statistics tend to indicate that real per capita income has not increased in decades.

     

    One of the successful areas of economic growth is telecommunications. About 90% of the population has mobile phones and about 25% have internet access. Data center capacity is expanding.

    Nigeria is forming economic ties with China. In June-August 2025, Chinese exports rose almost 60%. The increase was tied to Chinese Belt and Road infrastructure projects in the country, led by demand for equipment to build Chinese-financed railroads and power generation.

    ELECTRICITY

     

    A crucial reason for the lack of economic growth has been the government’s failure to provide enough dependable electricity.

     

    The electricity power grid is owned and operated by the government. Of Nigeria’s 233 million people, over 90 million do not have access to electricity. Nigeria’s electricity production per person is one of the lowest in the world. Long term underinvestment results in frequent blackouts and shortages. Many users, including the government, do not pay their electricity bills; revenue accounts for about 65% of operating costs.

     

    Private gas-powered generators generate more than twice as much electricity as the power grid. Nigerians’ spending on off-grid power is equal to 60% of the government’s entire budget. Cities suffer from noise and air pollution.

    Over half of the country’s manufacturing sector is not connected. New data centers have to provide their own power.

     

    There are plans to build off-grid solar and other renewable energy projects. Even if successful, they will not close Nigeria’s massive electricity shortage. And if successful, there will probably be fewer customers on the grid, making it even harder to expand and modernize it. 

     

    Government energy policy seems inconsistent; it would like to have solar projects connected to the grid, but it is also thinking about banning solar panel imports.

     

         This discussion of electricity is based on The                                     Economist, “A nation in the dark,” May 10, 2025,         38.

    Unless banned, roof-top solar panel installations will probably increase rapidly. The price of Chinese exported solar panels has fallen over 50% in the last three years because of overcapacity and price wars.

    China has built a high-speed rail line between two suburbs.

     

    POLITICAL


    Nigeria’s borders were established by England, Nigeria’s colonial master, in 1898. England combined several kingdoms into an arbritary

    administrative area.

     

    The largest ethnic group – Hausa – makes up about 30% of the population. But there are about 275 distinct ethnic groups and about 500 languages and dialects. The population is about evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. Muslims predominate in the north, Christians in the south. There is resentment in the north that the south has benefited more from the oil wealth. The Muslim population, with a higher birth rate, is increasing its share of the total population.  

     

    Nigeria has had a tumultuous political history since independence. National politics has been dominated by military coups, fighting among top military officers for power, and brutal military governments. Civilian governments have tended to be corrupt. 2023 was the first national election in Nigeria’s history where no “civilian” candidate was not a former military ruler.  

     

    There was a brutal civil war shortly after independence. The predominantly Muslim region in the north is experiencing jihadist terrorism.

     

    Politics has suffered from widespread corruption and the inability to support economic development beyond oil extraction. The country suffers from high inflation and large government fiscal deficits.

    OTHER TOPICS

     

    The oil producing region of Nigeria is one of the most polluted areas in the world.

     

    As farmers attempt to expand food production, the result has been massive deforestation as bad as in the Amazon. Even with this, food production has not kept up with population growth. Nigeria has gone from being a net food exporter to a net food importer.

    According to Doctors Without Borders, there is widespread malnutrition in northern Nigeria.

     

    Global warming has made producing food more difficult. It is one reason for the large rural migration to the cities.

    ===================================== 

    For a discussion of Africa’s demographics and future population, see the essay cited above.

    Global Demographics and Population Projections


    There are other essays on demographics and population projections for the global economy and individual countries.


    Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States


    Demographics and Population Projections of Japan


    For a variety of essays, with links, on this blog, see

    List of Post by Topics



     

  • Global Demographics and Economic Growth

    Global Demographics and Economic Growth

    1. Jakarta – 30 million people and sinking

    GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHICS

    Demographics, the study of the size and composition of population, will shape national and global economic growth and economic policy.  

    The period from 1950 to 2000 was highly unusual. The American “baby boom” started, temporarily reversing the long-term decline in birth rates.  Not just the United States but the global population experienced high birthrates and high population growth rates. In the middle of this period, partly due to more effective and more available birth control, birth rates began a rapid decline. The growth rate in world population began to fall. At the same time, much of the world’s population experienced rising standards of living. One consequence was longer life expectancies and rising average ages in industialized countries.  

    Countries with over a third of the world’s population and most of the world’s output now have birth rates below replacement. They are mostly the wealthy, industrialized countries, including the United States, Canada, Brazil, Western and Eastern Europe, Turkey, parts of Southeast Asia, Japan, Russia and China. Collectively, the size of their labor forces have stopped growing. All countries face the same challenges: Will they be able to invest in economic growth and development (innovation and structural change), deal with environmental costs and climate change effects, and support aging populations?  

    There are falling birthrates for most of the rest of the world’s population, coming down from very high levels. Mexico is at replacement and India is close to the replacement birthrate. But total population continues to grow, partly because of lower infant and child mortality rates, public health programs, better medicine, and subsequently longer lives in most of the world.  

    We are now in a period of a slowdown in total population growth rates. Global population is growing at about one percent per year and the rate continues to fall. But the increase in the number of people is large. In the most recent United Nations projection, the increase in global population from 2020 to 2050 is about 2 billion people, from 7.8 billion to 9.7 billion. The projected population increase over the following 50 years is lower, abour 1.2 billion. 

    Changes in total population may be points on an exponential decay curve. The UN projects that zero population growth will be achieved sometime shortly before 2100. The rate of decline could change with changes in the availability and cost of birth control, education of women, anti-aging medical technologies and more available health care for an aging population. (Estimates of future population are from June 17, 2019 UN projections. UN projections are revised about every two years.)

    The biggest unknown is future medical technology that will prolong life expectancies. Regardless of projection, the fastest growing age cohort is 65 years and over; within that cohort, the fastest growing age group is 80 years and older.

    Countries with birthrates well below replacement and aging populations may experience accelerating decreases in population. Family planning, combined with urbanization and more education of females, could lead to birth rates declining faster than projected in high birth-rate countries. In Africa, Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda promoted family planning and have seen large decreases in their birth rates. Kenya, after investing in family planning clinics and information, has seen its fertility rate fall from 6.5 in the late 1980s to 2.4, marginally above replacement and half the rate of most African countries.

    POOR COUNTRIES AND RICH COUNTRIES

    Wealthy countries have below replacement birth rates, no growth or declining populations and labor forces, low real economic growth, and aging populations and labor forces. Population will continue to concentrate in cities; the population of a small number of cities will be responsible for technological innovation and economic development. Rural areas will continue to lose population.

    Poor countries today have high but declining birth rates, young and increasing populations, and populations that want to emigrate (see case study below).

    Most of the largest and fastest growing urban areas in the world are in poor countries, China and India. Over half of the world’s population live in cities and the percent is rising. Almost all of the increased population in poor countries will live in or move to cities, which are already ecological disasters – traffic gridlock, poor air quality, lack of infrasturcture, sinking, raw sewage, and power outages. Many are coastal cities that are already experiencing periodic flooding and storm surges; rising sea levels and the increased number and severity of hurricanes will intensify urban problems. 

    Starting sometime in the 2050s, the world’s population outside of sub-Saharan Africa will stop growing and then slowly decline. All of the world’s net population growth will then be in Africa. How soon the world reaches zero population growth will depend critically on how fast birthrates decline in Africa.

    By 2100, Africa could have about as many people as Asia, about 4-5 billion. Together, Africa and Asia in 2100 could have about 80% of the world’s population.

    Throughout large parts of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, governments have not been able to provide effective management of economic development for their young, growing population, which have high rates of unemployment and underemployment. Many of the governments are corrupt and/or repressive without free elections or civil liberties. Political activism, partly caused by stagnant or declining standards of living and lack of economic opportunity for young workers, commonly takes the form of mass protests and street demonstrations, aided by Internet social media. Governments typically react with riot police and the military, arrests, torture and prisons, rather than economic and political reform.

    THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SPECIFIC REGIONS AND COUNTRIES

    A recent survey concludes that 46 countries have declining population or will have declining population in the near future. Declining population is already true in Japan (see below) and Russia and is about to be true in central and eastern Europe. South Korea, also with an extremely low birth rate, is looking at a demographic future similar to Japan’s (see below). South Korea’s current population of 51 million is expected to decline to about 30 million in 2100.

    Russia’s population is declining. Male life expectancies in Russia have been going down for decades but might have recently stabilized. While birthrates are below replacement, the decline of the national population has been offset in recent years by immigration. But lower rates of immigration in 2018 and 2019 have led to large decreases in population. The UN projection is that Russia’s current population of around 146 million will fall to about 85 million by the end of the century. 

    Because of very low birthrates and out-migration, central and eastern Europe is looking at population declines in this generation.  Some UN projections show that most countries in central and eastern Europe might have even larger total percent declines than Japan by the end of the century (over 50%).

    Western Europe is further along the population aging curve but because of immigration of younger people, the decline will not be as precipitous. And western Europe, like Japan, currently starts with more resources to support an aging population.  But high structural unemployment rates, low economic growth, restrictive labor laws and generous early retirement benefits will strain western Europe’s ability to grow and maintain current social welfare levels. A few European countries realize that current levels of social welfare are not sustainable and have begun reviews of retirement and health care programs. This problem is exacerbated by the currently high unemployment and underemployment rates among younger employees.

    China, which has enforced a “one-child” program since the 1970s until 2016, has a very low birthrate of about 1.6. Although this program has been relaxed in recent years, the national birthrate remains far below replacement. China currently has a young average-age population but the average age is rising very rapidly. 

    China’s working-age population began shrinking in 2012.  By around 2050, the decrease will be about the size of the current U.S. total labor force. Next year, the median (half above, half below) age in China will pass that of the United States. By around 2045, the percent of China’s population over the age of 65 will be about equal that of the United States. 

    A mature, experienced workforce should help maintain high but falling economic growth rates for another generation. After about 2050, demographics will begin working against Chinese economic growth. 

    China will grow old before it becomes rich (high per capita income). Even after decades of spectacular growth, per capita income is still about one-third to one-fourth that of South Korea and Japan. Even worse off are the economies of Southeast Asia, with per capita incomes below China, similar birthrates and rapidly aging populations.  

    Given current political strains and a large Chinese population outside of China, it is possible that China will have larger net outmigration in the future.

    DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

    The following accounting identity shows the sources of economic growth. An accounting identity says nothing about causality, assumptions or feedbacks. But it introduces some general issues.

    The economic growth rate of a country roughly equals the growth rate of the labor force plus the increase in productivity (output per member of the labor force).

    If the labor force numbers are stable, all of the increase in output depends on the increase in productivity. The pressure on productivity is even greater if the labor force numbers are decreasing. So, for example, if a labor force is increasing at about 1% per year and productivity is increasing at about 1% per year, output will increase about 2% per year. If the workforce stops growing, productivity would have to double to 2% to yield the same economic growth. If the workforce were to decrease at 1% year, as it is in a number of countries already, productivity would have to increase 3% a year to achieve 2% economic growth. This is a high productivity growth rate for a developed economy.

    There is a small amount of research that suggests that an aging labor force is one cause of slowing productivity growth.

    Low rates of productivity growth with accelerating rates of labor force and population decline could lead to less output (negative growth rates) and declining standards of living.

    A member of the industrial/information workforce today is better educated, with new skills, compared to a member of the labor force a generation or two ago. The difference should show up in an increase in labor productivity. Increase in total factor productivity will be due to innovation in capital equipment – including information technology, robotics and artificial intelligence algorithms – and demand for employees with new skills and knowledge. Other factors are public investment and organizational innovation. But these changes have not shown up in productivity measurements. Productivity growth rates are low, although I suspect that the methodology used to compute these figures underestimates the gains.

    Demographics are heavily influencing the areas of investment in wealthy countries; these sectors will drive future economic growth. The three most active areas of research and net investment are robots and AI (reaction to declining workforce), driverless vehicles (same), and biotechnology (health care for an aging population).

    Demographics also influence the demand side of economies. The changing age structure of the economy influences the “market basket” of consumer spending. Certainly the large increase in the number of senior citizens (and their income) is having a major impact on health care spending. To say nothing about the increase in demand for tourism, gambling and south Florida real estate. (I once predicted that marijuana would be legalized when a large number of baby boomers became 65 and older.)

    An aging population is not necessarily bad for economic growth. A healthy population beyond retirement age is leading in the United States to an increasing percent of senior citizens remaining in the work force. With a rising percent of the population over 65 and living longer, health care is a growing percent of output. The health care sector is very innovative, which is a source of economic development and thus economic growth. 

    Companies use demographic information when planning marketing and advertising strategies. Changing demographics are analyzed when developing new products, changing product mix, and segmenting markets. The explosion of detailed demographic information about smaller and smaller segments, including individuals, combined with online marketing technology, is revolutionizing marketing and advertising.

    Areas of the world like Africa face the opposite problem. Working-age population will increase rapidly for a generation or two. But unemployment rates may be high and marginal productivity may be close to zero, or negative in rural areas. With high growth rates of population, economic growth rates will have to be high – over 6% per year – for a sustained period to raise real per capita income (standard of living) and reduce unemployment.  

    IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

    The standard economic models demonstrate that the demographic changes we are seeing are a function of economic growth and development. Industrializing, better educated, urbanizing populations have declining birth rates. But the experience of the poorer regions of the world tends to indicate that these demographic changes are occurring even without economic growth and development.

    Although wealthier countries concentrate on the costs of their rapidly growing retired population, for most of the world the critical question over the next two generations will be how to accelerate economic growth to provide jobs and opportunity for the growing working age population.  The related challenge is how to improve education, training, and economic opportunity to raise standards of living now to provide the resources for the aging population in the future. 

    For the entire world, these objectives are complicated by how to pay for the social costs of past industrialization and environmental degradation, and the future costs of climate change.

    Increasing population and rising real income in emerging economies, especially in Asia, are increasing the demand for energy. China, which had no privately owned cars in 1979, is now the world’s largest automobile market. A dramatic increase in the number of cars is the main reason for the continuing increase in the global demand for oil.  Increased demand for electricity is being met largely with new power plants burning fossil fuels. For at least another generation, these trends will make it difficult to meet global goals to drastically slow down or stop global warming.

    Demographics is interacting with climate change in another important area – food production. Many scientists believe the most serious effect of climate change will be its impact on food production. Global warming and more extreme weather events will make it more difficult to expand food production using current technology. As in other areas, trend projections can be changed by the development of new techology.

    In the long run, the positive side of declining global population will probably be less demand for resources. Combined with substitute technology, global warming might slow down or stop. Climate change might not have quite the devastating effects trend projections indicate.

    The advanced and industrialized countries with stable or declining populations and workforces will have to consider the following:

    Economic growth will have to come from large increases in productivity (output per member of the workforce). To achieve this, and also meet social welfare costs, most countries and regions such as the European Union will have to make radical changes in economic policies. Particularly disruptive and contentious will be the adoption of automated factories and offices. On the positive side they will increase labor and total productivity; on the negative side they will probably eliminate or “deskill” a large number of existing and future jobs.

    Large increases in retirement age populations is leading to serious underfunding of public and private pension funds. Taxes to fund public pension funds are rising rapidly, both in amount and as percent of government budgets. Despite this, unfunded liabilities – promised future benefits not covered by projected future revenue from taxes – are also rising rapidly.

    Multinational corporations will develop and adopt the new technology. Countries that do not have quality education, encourage innovation and change economic incentives will not be able to attract investment and compete in the global economy. And their best educated and most motivated people may go somewhere else, as is happening in eastern Europe and many developing countries.

    On the other hand, poor countries with decent transportation, energy and communication infrastructure will probably attract foreign investment. Real wages of at least part of the labor force will rise.

    Attitudes towards immigration might change from the current restrictive policies of some countries. Attracting “human capital” will be just as important as attracting investment capital. Trans-border movement of people will increase. New national, regional and international agreements will have to be negotiated.  Remittances back to the home country will be a more important part of the economy of many countries and global capital flows. 

    Attitudes about work, labor laws, retirement and retirement ages will change. The benchmark age of 65 was arbitrarily set by Bismarck almost 150 years ago when less than one percent of the German population lived that long. When the United States adopted Social Security, life expectancy was 56 years. The life expectancy of America’s younger workers is already over 80 years.

    DEMOGRAPHICS AND PUBLIC ECONOMIC POLICIES

    If the labor force is not growing or actually shrinking, as it is in most industrialized economies, and the non-working population is growing, one consequence is likely to be growing government budget deficits. Growing government deficits as a percent of GDP may be a function of no economic growth or slow economic growth, not the other way around as suggested by economic research.

    It is how a government spends its income, more than the size of the deficit, that matters. Public investment substitutes for stagnant private consumption spending. Investment, both public and private, substitutes demand for innovation for demand for existing goods. This could increase productivity and result in new products and services. Economic growth then will depend on high levels of new technology and increased productivity (output per employee).

    JAPAN AS A POSSIBLE MODEL (OR WARNING) FOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

    Figures are from The Economist, “Japan’s economic troubles offer a glimpse of a sobering future,” December 5, 2019.

    Japan is a possible model for the future of other wealthy countries. Japan has a shrinking population and workforce. This will continue. It is not surprising Japan leads the world in developing and installing robots. Robots and AI are also alternatives to immigrants. Japanese companies export capital and technology. Facing falling population, Japan is slowly increasing the number of foreigners allowed into Japan on temporary work permits. But the number remains small, below 1%.

    Japan’s real GDP has been basically stagnant (about one percent per year) over the last 30 years. Without immigration and structural changes to Japan’s political and economic system, Japan’s real GDP in the future will grow slowly at best and eventually decline along with its population. In the long run, Japan will continue on its path to demographic and economic self-destruction.

    CONCLUSIONS

    Demographic trends have important consequences for economic growth and public policies. They cannot be seen in isolation. Neither can any of the other major trends. They are interrelated. 

    ·      Rising global population but at lower rates, mostly in poor countries, for the remainder of the century. After the 2050s, all of the world’s net population increase will occur in Africa. Global population may stop growing by the end of the century. 

    ·      Rising population in poor countries makes high rates of economic growth both pressing and difficult. Emigration pressure from poor regions of the world will probably increase unless there are high rates of economic growth.

    ·      Most of the world’s population increase will take place in cities and surrounding metropolitan areas, creating even larger massive urban areas. Large urban areas are increasing rapidly in poorer countries. 

    ·      Static, falling and aging populations in the wealthier, industrialized countries. Static or declining labor forces mean all economic growth will depend on increases in productivity. To counter demographic trends, technological innovation (robotics and software) leading to high rates of productivity growth will be necessary to increase standards of living (real income per person).

    ·      Problems with unemployment and underemployment, stagnant and declining real incomes and income inequality will probably get worse as artificial intelligence and robotics accelerates the substitution of capital for labor.

    Economic development and growth since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution has been aided by large increases in populations and especially the working age population. But in the future, economic development and growth in most of the world will have to occur with stagnant or declining labor forces and aging populations.

    =====================================================

  • Arab Spring, Arab Autumn

    The post-war rule of autocratic, secular strongmen backed by
    their military and secret police is coming to an end.  Last year saw the fall of regimes in Egypt,
    Tunisia, Libya
    and Yemen.  There is open revolt in Syria.  Demonstrations continue in Bahrain,
    even after earlier demonstrations were suppressed by Saudi Arabian troops.  The kings of Morocco
    and Jordan have
    made concessions towards democracy.  A
    democratic election that went against the ayatollah-supported regime in Iran
    was disqualified and leaders were arrested; despite this, anti-government
    demonstrations continue.  Then there is
    the special case of the overthrow of Hussein in Iraq.


    The immediate issue is the lack of economic growth and
    development, the inability to provide jobs for its young population.  The demographic clock is ticking.  Within a generation or two, the Middle
    East will have a smaller, older population, with the possibility
    of far fewer resources to support it.


    THE ROLE OF DEMOGRAPHICS


    The most surprising fact about the Middle East
    is the low birthrate in the populous countries of Egypt,
    Iran and Turkey
    (also Tunisia
    and Algeria).  The Arab world, Turkey
    and Iran are
    facing a demographic decline.  The region
    is far along one of the fastest declines in birthrates in history.  From 1950 to 2010, it went from some of the
    highest birthrates in the world to some of the lowest.  Birthrates in Iran,
    Turkey, Algeria
    and Tunisia are
    below replacement.  Egypt’s
    birthrate is rapidly approaching replacement.


    One-third of the current population in Arab countries is
    between 15 and 29 years old.  We are looking
    at the last Arab and Iranian “baby boomer” generation.  The population profile of these countries will
    go from a young to a rapidly aging population distribution over the next 30-50
    years.  The tragedy is that this could
    happen without rapid economic development. 


    The presidents of Turkey
    and Iran have
    talked about their countries’ low birthrates. 
    They are fully aware of the social stresses and political consequences.  In Turkey,
    the higher birth rate among the minority Kurds than among Turks is shifting the
    demographic balance.  Kurdish demands for
    more autonomy, or even a separate state, will become harder to resist,
    especially now that there is forming a de
    facto
    Kurdish state in neighboring Iraq. 


    EGYPT


    Egypt’s
    population 35 years ago was around 40 million; today it is 82 million.  Economic development has not kept up and the
    recent political turmoil has had a negative impact of the Egyptian economy.  Egypt
    is experiencing serious environmental degradation, according to a World Bank
    study.  Part of the problem is that poor
    agricultural practices are creating soil erosion and the spread of deserts.  Even current levels of food production may
    not be sustainable without drastic changes in agricultural practices, which
    would have destabilizing political consequences.


    The pictures of Egyptian protesters are somewhat
    misleading.  The protesters appeared to
    be overwhelming young, reflecting the population in the Middle East
    and North Africa. 
    But Egypt
    also has a large rural population and high rates of illiteracy, especially
    among females.  The quality of education
    is poor and, as in most less-developed countries, there are very high rates of
    unemployment among the young. 


    The tech-savvy, often bilingual young people who appeared on
    U.S. news
    channels are a very small percent of Egyptian society.  Egypt
    has about 500,000 Internet connections in a country of 82 million people.  The democratic coalition did very poorly in
    the first round of elections.  The
    Islamic parties drew their strength from the rural and urban poor. 


    Egypt’s
    economic situation is becoming critical. 
    Despite a large rural population, Egypt
    cannot feed its population.  Egypt
    is the world’s largest importer of wheat. 
    It runs a large trade deficit, which has been covered by tourism (Egypt’s
    largest source of foreign capital), remittances from Egyptians working outside
    the country, the Suez Canal and foreign aid.  Tourism has
    temporarily ceased and Egyptians working in neighboring Libya
    have come home.  Foreign reserves are
    decreasing rapidly, partly because of capital flight.  


    In addition, political turmoil in Egypt has apparently revived Israeli plans to build a high-speed railroad to carry containers from its port on the Red Sea to a Mediterranean port.  Some cargo ships then be able to bypass the Suez Canal and transport time between Asia and Europe will be reduced.


    IRAN


    Iran’s
    ability to deal with its economic problems is more difficult today than in 1979
    when the Islamic Revolution began.  In
    1979, Iran’s
    population was 37 million; it is now 75 million.  Iran,
    like other Muslim countries, is going through a “demographic transition” from
    high birthrates and high population growth to low birthrates and an aging
    population at a time when the country is experiencing severe economic stress
    and probably declining economic output.


    Iran’s
    birthrate is very low.  Even if it
    doesn’t continue to decline, sometime after 2050 there will be more Iranians
    aged 55-75 than 20-40.  Iran’s
    age distribution will look like Europe but probably
    without the economic resources to support an aging population.


    The Iranian economy may be on borrowed time.  Oil production is declining although oil
    revenues would be up, because of high world prices, if it were not for the economic
    sanctions.  Reflecting the lack of
    internal economic development, Iran
    is a large importer of refined oil products. 
    The price of gasoline is heavily subsidized with the revenue from
    selling crude oil.  Iran
    may not be a net oil exporter in about 15 years without massive new investment
    in its oil infrastructure.  But decreasing
    the massive subsidies for gasoline and other basic products runs the political
    risk of decreasing support for the Islamic rulers.


    Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons have taken a heavy
    economic toll.  American and European
    boycotts and sanctions have damaged the Iranian economy.  Oil revenue has been cut in half, from $100
    billion a year to $50 billion a year. 
    There are shortages of virtually all products.  Inflation rates are very high.  Despite the “charm offensive” of Iran’s
    new president, it is unlikely that Iran
    will abandon its program of producing nuclear weapons.  The leaders of the powerful Revolutionary
    Guard, which manages the weapons program, have publicly told the new president
    that they will not support any suspension or abandonment of building nuclear
    weapons.


    In addition, Iran
    is threatened by climate change and environmental challenges.  The immediate problem is water.  According to the former Iranian agricultural
    minister (an adviser to the new president), groundwater is decreasing and all
    bodies of natural water are drying up. 
    Deserts in Iran
    are spreading.  He fears that large parts
    of Iran will be
    uninhabitable in 30 years. 


    GENERAL COMMENTS


    With the exception of Turkey,
    Muslim countries in the Middle East have failed to
    compete in the global economy.  They have
    not attracted foreign capital investment, except in the areas of oil and
    tourism.


    Arab countries and Iran
    do not produce goods and services they can sell in global markets.  Even with proximity to Europe,
    literacy and low wages, they cannot compete with East Asia.  All of the countries have an undereducated
    young population with very high unemployment rates (an estimated 30% in Egypt).  Many educated Arabs look for opportunities
    elsewhere.  Except for oil, the Arab
    countries and Iran
    have total exports that are less than those of Israel.  A rough equivalent would be if New
    Jersey, with less than 3% of the U.S.
    population, exported more goods and services to the rest of the world than the
    other 49 states combined.


    Even the oil-rich countries have not fared well over the
    last 40 years.  The “oil curse” was discussed
    in an earlier post.  Much of the oil
    revenue has been spent fighting wars, on high military and “internal security”
    spending, supporting a small political and economic elite and, in Dubai,
    insanely expensive building (see Mission Impossible III) that has bankrupted the country.


    Given the future demographics, it may be too late.  Egypt,
    like other countries, had 60 years of military and autocratic rule.  Its rulers failed to provide universal,
    quality education, and economic growth and development.  It has enriched a small,
    politically-connected elite and a privileged military.  We are looking at the political consequences
    of this failure.  But providing economic
    growth and development, or world-class secular education, may not be too high
    on the agenda of new governments. 


    It is wide open what will come next.  It may not be democracy in some countries.  Recent actions by the military in Egypt
    indicate that they are not ready to tolerate an open, democratic society.  The military has used violence against
    demonstrations of Coptic Christians and raided the offices of foreign NGOs
    promoting democracy.  The democratic
    coalition fared poorly in the recent election, with Islamic parties receiving
    about two-thirds of the vote. 


    IN THE LONG RUN


    However, I am “cautiously optimistic” about the long
    run.  For decades, I’ve heard how there
    would never be democracy in “Confucian” cultures in East Asia or in “caudillo”
    cultures in Latin America.  Who would
    have thought that democratic governments would be the norm in central Europe?  Multi-party democracy has returned to Indonesia
    (another Muslim country with a low birthrate) with the end of the Sukarno
    regime.  Besides South
    Africa, at least five other African
    countries have held multi-party elections in the last few years.  Even the oppressive military regime of Burma
    (Myanmar)
    appears ready to tolerate at least some democracy.


    Arab countries are riven by ethnic, clan and sectarian
    conflicts.  Traditional society is still
    strong.  Whether power can be shared and
    conflicts compromised through elections remains to be seen.  For Islamic parties, there is the negative
    example of Iran.  Not only has the regime turned most of its
    young people against it, but also against religious participation.  There is some polling evidence that Iran
    (or at least Tehran) has the lowest
    religious attendance in the Middle East.


    There will still be brutal regimes in the world.  But opposition to such regimes will be fed
    by, among other factors, their inability to provide economic growth, good mass
    education, jobs (outside of those for people with political influence) and
    economic opportunity to their young populations.  Once again, a “baby boomer” generation is
    driving political change.