Author: Bennett Greenberg

Demographics and Population Projections of Japan

INTRODUCTION

Japan gets special consideration because it is further along the demographics declining population curve than any other large country. It has the oldest population (highest average age) in the world. It has one of the world’s lowest birth rates. Unless there are major changes in healthcare technology, immigration, public policy, and birth rates, most industrialized countries will follow Japan down the path of declining and aging populations, and smaller labor forces.

Japan’s demographics and immigration have become major political issues. In the July 2025 elections, two right-wing parties made substantial gains against the long-ruling Liberal Democracy Party (LDP). Two of their main issues were the rapid rise of immigration and the repeal of a 10% consumption tax used to pay for the rising costs of supporting the aged. Both parties appealed to young voters. The LDP has nominated a candidate for prime minister who also takes a hard line on immigration.

PROJECTIONS

Japan’s current (2024) population is around 122 million people. This is the 15^th year of population decline, down from a high of 128 million. The yearly decreases so far have been small, both in numbers and as a percent of the total. This is expected to continue until 2030. Then population decreases are expected to accelerate to a population of 104 million in 2050 and 87 million in 2070. At the end of the century, Japan’s population is projected to be 60-65 million people, about half its current size.

The high dependency ratio (the number of elderly divided by the number in working age groups – 46%, the highest in the world) is expected to rise to about 70% in 2050, about 75% in 2070 and about 80% in 2100. Not everyone in the working age group is in the labor force. Thus, by 2100, there will be almost one Japanese over 65 for every employee in the labor force. Government budgets will find it increasingly difficult to raise tax revenue to meet the rising social costs of an aging society.

Figures are from The Economist, “Japan’s economic troubles offer a glimpse of a sobering future,” December 5, 2019.

Japan has one of the lowest birth rates in the world at 1.2 in 2023. Also in 2023, the number of deaths was twice the number of births.

Japan has the world’s oldest population, both as measured as average age and with the highest percent of residents over 65.

LABOR FORCE AND FUTURE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Over the past 20 years, Japan’s working-age population has declined by more than 10 million workers, about 14% of the workforce. The current labor force (age group 15-64) is 73 million. By 2050, Japan’s working-age population is expected to fall to 53 million. (U.N. World Population Prospects 2022) In 2100, the labor force age group is expected to be about 32 million, about 40 million less than the current size.

Japan’s 65 and older population of 37 million is about 25% of the total. As early as 2050, about 40% of the adults will be over 65. Surprisingly, the number of Japan’s elderly is already near the projected maximum.

Current statistics from Japan’s Internal Affairs Ministry, July 24, 2024.

Projections from:

Statistica, ”Forecast of the total population in Japan from 2023 to 2120,” November, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/607427/japan-forecast-total-population/

Statistica, “Forecast of the total population in Japan from 2023 to 2120, by age group,” November 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/612575/japan-population-age-group/

Japan admitted few immigrant workers in the past to increase its labor force but the yearly number has been rising, up 330,000 in 2023. In 2025, there were 3.8 million immigrant workers in Japan. This was over 3% of its labor force. Most are on short-term or work visas (Japan calls them “trainees”) and are not expected to stay. Japan rejects 99% of applications for asylum. Under current law, it is very difficult for immigrants to become citizens or permanent residents.

In Japan, the labor force and the population are decreasing at about 1% per year. Productivity is increasing at about 1.3% per year, giving economic growth of 0.3% per year. But because of decreasing population, output per person is increasing at about 1.3% per year, or about the same as in the U.S. Growth rates are much lower but the increase in output per person is about the same. This may be one reason there is very little call for any economic, political or social reform in Japan despite almost no economic growth. And this has been going on since the 1990s. But the demographic trends may increase tensions between younger workers and retirees.

Japan’s real GDP has been basically stagnant over the last 25 years. Without structural changes to Japan’s political and economic system, Japan’s real GDP in the future will grow slowly at best and eventually decline along with its labor force and population.

As the size of the labor force decreases at a higher rate, and faster than the older age group, it is likely that output per capita will start to decrease.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE JAPANESE LABOR MARKET

The number of employed Japanese has not fallen as much as the decrease in the number of people in the prime labor force age groups. Until recently, this has been due to the increased participation rates of women in the labor force. But the high current female participation rate suggests little if any increase in workers from this past trend.

While female employment rates are high, over 50% of female employees hold part-time positions as seasonal or temporary workers. This means they are not covered under lifetime employment or job security guarantees. Many full-time female workers are classified as temporary to avoid giving them lifetime employment protection. As a group, female workers are probably underemployed.

As in other countries, employment does not stop at retirement age.

In Japan, as in the United States, many people over retirement ages own or work in small businesses. So the numbers in the prime working ages do not coincide with the number of employees.

Japan’s retirement age is 60, although older workers can request to work until they are 65. Many retired Japanese buy or work in small, local businesses such as noodle shops, small grocery stores or other kinds of small stores to supplement public or private pensions. Over 1/2 of Japanese aged 65-69 and more than 1/3 aged 70-75 are employed to supplement small retirement benefits. The percent falls to 12% for over-75. There are about 22 million in the over-75 category. Over-75s in Japan is about the average of over-65s in industrialized countries.

The Economist, “Japan’s 2025 Problem,” in The World Ahead

2025, 38.

As more people work beyond retirement age, countries will have to reassess retirement benefits and taxes on the elderly.

The Japanese government projects that social-security costs, including pensions, will increase by 60% between 2025 and 2040. A change in the pension system, probably to increase pensions, is scheduled for 2025.

Over 1/3 of the total foreign workers are from Vietnam, China or the Philippines. They tend to work in manufacturing or construction. Many recent immigrants come from Nepal or Myanmar. There is a lack of Korean workers. Japan is now attempting to attract foreign employees with technical skills or higher education.

About half of Japanese employees are between 45 and 54 years old. This indicates that about half of Japan’s current labor force could retire in the next 20 years.

Japan’s unemployment rate is low, between 2% and 3%. There is much discussion about companies finding it hard to hire as many employees as they would like. Government ministries are concerned about a national labor shortage that can only get worse. This would probably contribute to low economic growth in the future.

A peculiarity about the Japanese labor market. The definition of unemployed is more restrictive than in other countries. No one knows what the unemployment rate would be if Japan used the American definition.

The low unemployment rate, a slight decrease in the number of employed Japanese and the labor shortage, combined with higher inflation rates, are putting pressure on wage rates. In 2023, the average wage increase was around 5%, which is high for Japan. Wage increases might continue.

The overall impression is that the Japanese labor market is not very flexible and that workers tend to be less mobile than they might be under different rules and regulations. This may also be obstacle to raising labor productivity and a barrier to higher economic growth in the future.

JAPAN AS A MODEL – OLD AND RICH

Japan might serve as a model for future demographics of other countries in two different ways. One is as a model for countries with a high per capita income. The other is for countries that have a lower, often much lower, per capita income but are aging rapidly. This includes China and most of the countries of east and southeast Asia. They will grow old before they grow rich.

Most of the countries in east Asia, including China, have a birthrate equal to or lower than Japan’s. They are on a similar demographic curve, only a little behind. The difference is that Japan is much richer, with a substantially higher income per capita. If managed right, Japan has the resources to pay for adequate levels of support for its increasing numbers of senior citizens. The other countries will age before they achieve per capita incomes anywhere near Japan. This will probably put a greater strain on their public finances and they will not be able to provide adequate health and services support for their aging populations.

In economic theory, deficit-financed government spending is expected to make up for weak private consumption and domestic investment spending to ward off deflation and recession. In the future environment, however, demographics can overcome aggressive monetary and fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth. These policies have already failed in Japan. Zero interest rates on public debt, large budget deficits, high levels of government infrastructure spending and the highest national debt/GDP ratio in the world have not improved very low economic growth. A current (2025) rise in inflation rates and wages will put further strain on the Japanese economy.

The large budget deficits are financed by borrowing much of the country’s household savings at near zero interest rates. Japan’s central bank has just raised its equivalent to the Fed funds rate to 0.25%. Other central bankers are not impressed.

There is no chance of balanced budgets in the future. A rise in interest rates would make Japan’s financial problems worse.

Domestic demand is weak even though unemployment is low. Rather than raise wages, Japanese companies export manufacturing to other countries, especially China and other Asian countries. The is accompanied by substantial investment outside of Japan.

Japanese companies are starting to substitute robots for workers in Japan. Japan expects to greatly increase its use of robots, partly in health care services.

An aging population contributes to social and political resistance to structural reforms. The dominant political party substitutes government spending and subsidies, combined with appeals to Japanese traditions, for reforms that might threaten social stability. But there is a political backlash among young voters against the dominant party that they feel represents the interest of older voters.

All of this is before the economic costs of climate change and global warming. Japan in the past has suffered from devastating earthquakes. A recent tsunami destroyed a nuclear power complex.

HOW JAPAN IS DEALING WITH DECLINING LABOR FORCE

Japan is admitting foreign workers to increase its labor force. There are now about 3.8 million foreign workers, about 3% of the labor force. Foreign workers, as in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, are mostly segregated from the locals. Immigrant workers have no citizenship rights and can be deported at any time.

If Japan makes up the decrease in the size of its labor force with foreign workers, then by 2100 foreigners will make up about half of Japan’s workers.

Japan is a major producer of robots but the number of robots as a percent of employed workers is below China and South Korea but above other industrialized countries. This percentage (robots per 1,000 workers) is expected to rise. Japan is using some of its robots to provide services and companionship for senior citizens.

CONSEQUENCES OF JAPAN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE

Small number of children

The projection for Japan is that in 2100 there will be five times as many senior citizens over 65 then children aged 0-14. Children will make up less than 10% of the total population. No one seems to be thinking about the social and psychological consequences of this trend. Importing children for adoption? Surrogate mothers from other countries? Robotic pets and children as substitutes? (No joke – there are already robotic dogs and ponies.)

Continued cultural isolation?

Japan has been the most successful country in segregating its culture and moral values from outside influence, first as an island closed to outside influences (1600-1850s) and even now in the global communication world. Despite surface similarities to other modern economies and cultures, Japan remains opaque to outsiders. This might make it difficult to attract permanent immigrants and integrate them into Japanese society.

More outmigration of Japanese?

As the dependency ratio increases, putting a larger tax burden on working Japanese, it is possible that more Japanese will emigrate. One way might be to work for the overseas operations of Japanese corporations. Or join the Japanese communities in other countries such as Brazil or the United States. Or imitate the strategies of wealthy Chinese who are planning to leave their country. This will further decrease the number of births, the size of the labor force and the tax base.

Family vs. state care of the aged

With more Japanese not having children, the cultural imperative of children supporting elderly parents will be impossible to fulfill for many families, putting more of the burden on the state.

Part of the global economy

It is hard to see what future role Japan will play in the global economy besides as a source of financial capital. Japan might be relatively less important in the future. Already, Japan is not particularly innovative. The country is not a leader in most new tech industries – mostly robotics companies, a few pharmaceutical companies, some legacy technology in consumer electronics and online entertainment. Japan has already outsourced much of its manufacturing to other Asian countries, particularly China.

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For a other essays on demographic topics, see

Global Demographics and Population Projections

Demographics and Economic Growth

Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States

October 15, 2025

Global Demographics and Population Projections

City Life for Most Residents

Before reading this essay and related essays on demographics and population projections, you might want to start with an introduction:

Introduction to Demographics and Global Population Projections

SUMMARY

Global population has more than doubled since 1970, going from 3.7 billion to the current (November, 2023) total of 8.0 billion (UN numbers). The Lancet long-term projection is that world population will peak around 9.7 billion in the 2060s and then begin to decline, reaching around 8.8 billion people in 2100.

In the most recent United Nations projection (2024), global population is expected to peak at about 10.3 billion sometime in the 2080s and then fall to 10.2 billion in 2100.

By 2030, 1.4 billion people will be over the age of 60, with low- and middle-income countries accounting for 80% of older populations. About 25% of the total will be in China. This number is equal to China’s or India’s total population.

Compared to the present, Africa is expected to have about 2.2 billion

more people in 2100. The rest of the world is expected to see a decrease

of about 1.4 billion people. One billion of the decrease will occur in

China and India. The rest of the decrease will occur mostly in Europe,

southeast and southern Asia, and Japan. The United States and Latin

America (because of increasing population in Mexico) will see little

change. But due to recent changes in net immigration, the United States will probably see zero population growth by about 2031 (recent CBO projection) and then slowly decreasing population.

Nigeria’s population growth will be so great that the country will pass China by 2100 as the second most populous country in the world.

China has reached zero population growth. Between now and 2050, 43% of the world’s population increase will be accounted for by only five countries – India, Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. India’s population is expected to peak in the 2060s and then gradually decline.

Europe has the oldest average (median) age. Its population began shrinking in 2020. In 2050, its population will be about 40 million people less.

The following is the summary in the Lancet study.

The global population is projected to peak in 2064 at 9·7 billion people and decline to 8·8 billion in 2100. Findings also suggest a shifting age structure in many parts of the world, with 2·4 billion individuals older than 65 years and 1·7 billion individuals younger than 20 years globally in 2100. By 2050, 151 countries (out of 200) were forecasted to have a TFR lower than the replacement level (TFR <2·1), and 183 were forecasted to have a TFR lower than replacement by 2100. 23 countries, including Japan, Thailand, and Spain, were forecasted to have population declines greater than 50% from 2017 to 2100; China’s population was forecasted to decline by 48·0% to around 750 million.

DEFINITIONS AND BIRTH RATE PROJECTIONS

Demographics is the study of populations and how a population breaks down by age, gender, race and other variables. In this post, I will concentrate on trends and forecasts of the future population of the entire world and by regions and countries. Other posts concentrate on Japan and the United States in greater depth.

There are two concepts that are crucial to population projections:

Total Fertility Ratio (TFR). This is the ratio of the average number of children of women in child-bearing ages. For a population to be stable, women must have an average of 2.1 children each. Any smaller number means the population is “below replacement” and may decrease in the future.

The global birth rate (total fertility rate) is now about 2.3, slightly above the replacement rate of 2.1, and falling.

The global Total Fertility Ratio (TFR) in the Lancet study is forecasted to be 1.7 in 2100. By 2050, 151 countries were forecasted to have a TFR lower than the replacement level and 183 countries (out of approximately 193 countries) were forecasted to have a TFR lower than replacement by 2100.

A country may have below replacement birth rates and for some time also have expanding population if in the past it had above replacement birth rates, a large percent of its population were children and young adults, and the adult population is experiencing rising life expectancies. Or, the decrease in population is offset by immigration.

For Europe, the birth rate went below replacement in the 1970s and population stopped growing in 2020. For China, an extremely low birth rate started in the 1990s (one child policy), never recovered even when the policy was abandoned. China’s population probably peaked in 2023.

Dependency Ratio. This is the ratio of the age categories (usually children plus over 65) to the working-age population. In aging societies, it is often the ratio of 65 and older to the working-age population.

MAIN SOURCES OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS

Until 2020, the standard source of long-run population projections was United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects 2024.”

Population.UN.org

A new set of projections was published in Lancet in 2020:

Stein Emil Vollset, et al, “ Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study,” Lancet, 2020, VOlume 396, ISSUE 10258, 1285–306.

Published Online July 14, 2020 https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(20)30677-2

It seems to me that the methodology use by the Lancet study is preferable to the United Nations study. Lancet authors’ explanation of their methodology is quoted in the appendix.

The Lancet projections, based on trends into the 2010s, may be too high.

INTRODUCTION

The posts on demographics contain long-term forecasts. They give the best estimates, given the assumptions. All contain large ranges of uncertainty (standard deviations or uncertainty interval). Generally, the further out the forecast, the larger the uncertainty interval. It is impossible to forecast major changes in health care technology, immigration laws and other variables that could change the exponential trends.

With low birth rates in many parts of the world, an “exogenous” (outside) event like Covid or the war in Ukraine can affect intermediate (2050) or long term (2100) projections for an individual country, region, or the entire world.

Over the last few years, there has been major changes in global demographic forecasts. Generally, they have forecasted slower rates of growth, earlier dates for maximum population (2060s), and shrinking population from maximum population to the year 2100.

GLOBAL POPULATION

Since the beginning of the Agricultural Revolution about 10,000 years ago, demographics meant high birth rates, high infant mortality rates, low life expectancies, and high death rates. Until the Industrial Revolution, starting in the late 1700s. Death rates fell faster than birth rates; better health and health care reduced infant mortality rates.

At the same time, much of the world’s population experienced rising standards of living. Better public health reached poorer parts of the world. Urbanization, which lowers birth rate, greatly expanded. Better education, especially for females, is correlated with falling birth rates. One consequence was longer life expectancies and rising average ages in industrialized countries and then in poorer countries. The age composition of the global population changed, as the average age of the populations in most countries started rising.

During this transition period, from the late 1800s to the present, average life expectancies increased from roughly 30 years to 75-80 years in industrializing countries.

After World War II, the global population exploded:

1900 – Approximately 1.6 billion people

1950 – 2.6 billion

2000 – 6.1 billion

2020 – 7.7 billion

2024 – 8.0 billion (November, 2023)

This spectacular increase in population, combined with equally spectacular increases in energy-intensive production and consumption, has contributed to the current global warming crisis. This is more amazing because the earth was in a long-term, gradual cooling cycle. For an excellent book that explains the science and history behind long-term climate cycles, see Peter Brannen, The Story of CO2 is the Story of Everything: How Carbon Dioxide Made Our World, 2025,

Again, the Lancet global population projections are:

2064 – 9.7 billion (the peak global population)

2100 – 8.8 billion

The period from 1950 to 2000 was unusual. Not just in the United States, the global population experienced high birthrates and high population growth rates. In the middle of this period, partly due to more effective and more available birth control, birth rates began a rapid decline in the industrialized countries. The growth rate of the world population began to slow.

The industrialized and modernizing parts of the world now have low birth rates – mostly below replacement – and low death rates. Birth rates are also falling in much of the rest of the world. One factor that is seldom discussed is that birth rates continue to fall in countries that are already at below replacement. One example is the United States.

Declining population is already true in Japan, China and Russia, and parts of central and eastern Europe and much of East Asia (including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea). European countries will see 30-50% decreases in the long run.

It is important to remember, but seldom discussed, that a projection of declining population or shrinking labor force to 2050 or 2100 does not mean that the decreases stop in those years. These are points on an exponentially declining curve. Decreases in total population eventually fall, as the number of children declines, the number of adults below 65 years of age fall, and then the number of senior citizens fall.

This assumes no technological or attitudinal changes leading to higher number of births, that a higher percent of heathier seniors will not work longer or retire later, that projections of longer life expectancies are not dramatically higher. Also, no speculation about the future possibility of massive migration, the long-term effects of global warming and climate change, or changes in retirement ages, laws, and programs. No speculation on when the research and innovation in health care technology will become widespread.

As populations and the labor forces of a country decrease, it is possible that income per capita will continue to rise for a generation or two. But in the long run, income per capita will probably fall.

Some of the more speculative projections are that a world of robots and AI may replace some or much of the future declining labor force and increase productivity. If so, it may be that a shrinking, aging population may also have a rising standard of living. But it is nearly impossible to predict technological and organizational change over the next 25 or 50 years.

GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHICS

Outside of Africa, the global birth rate is already below replacement but longer life expectancies will lead to continued population growth for one or two generations. About 43 countries already have declining populations.

Countries with over a third of the world’s population and most of the world’s output now have birth rates below or at replacement. They are mostly the wealthy, industrialized countries, including the United States, Canada, Brazil, Western and Central Europe, Turkey, parts of Southeast Asia, Japan, Russia and China. Collectively, the size of their labor forces has stopped growing. India has a falling birth rate that just fell below replacement. This will add another 17% of the world’s population that has a below replacement birth rate.

There are falling birth rates for most of the rest of the world’s population, coming down from very high levels. But total population continues to grow, partly because of lower infant and child mortality rates, public health programs, better medicine, and longer lives in most of the world.

Barring catastrophe or economic collapse from increasing population, Africa will probably not reach zero population growth until some time around 2100. Possibly sooner if birth rates fall faster than currently forecasted.

Regardless of what happens to the size of the labor forces in individual countries, the size of the global labor force after around 2100 will start to fall. A global question may be how it is allocated.

All countries will face the same challenges: With declining populations and smaller labor forces, will they be able to invest in economic growth and development (innovation and structural change), deal with environmental costs and climate change, and support aging populations?

GLOBAL FORECASTS

The following are forecasts in the Lancet long-run projection. First, a summary of the global forecast.

Region

2017

Population in billions

Projected 2100

Population in billions

2017

Birth Rate

Projected 2100

Birth Rate

Global

7.64

8.79

2.37

1.66

The total global population in 2024 is around 8 billion. A maximum global population of around 9.7 billion is expected to occur around 2064. The global birth rate will be below replacement. So over the next 40 years (2025-2065), the world’s population will rise by about 1.7 billion and then over the 35 years after that, decline by approximately 0.9 billion (900 million). By 2100, the global population will have fallen to 8.8 billion.

We are now in a period of a slowdown in total population growth rates. Global population is growing at about one percent per year and the rate continues to fall. But the increase in the number of people is large, about 80 million people a year.

Changes in total population may be points on an exponential decay curve. The decline in numbers after achieving the maximum in the 2060s may be slow for a few years and then accelerate. The timing will depend on how fast the African birth rate falls.

The rate of decline could change with changes in the availability and cost of birth control, anti-aging medical technologies, and more available health care for an aging population.

The biggest unknown is future medical technology that will prolong life expectancies. Technological advances might also decrease medical costs per capita. Regardless of the projection, the fastest growing age cohort in the foreseeable future is 80 years and older.

Countries with birthrates well below replacement and aging populations will experience accelerating decreases in population.

POOR COUNTRIES AND RICH COUNTRIES

Wealthy countries have below replacement birth rates, no growth or declining populations and labor forces, low real economic growth and aging populations and labor forces. Population will continue to concentrate in cities; the population of a small number of cities will be responsible for technological innovation and economic development. Rural areas will continue to lose population.

Africa and a few poor countries outside of Africa will have the opposite problem. They will have above replacement birth rates for a generation or two. This will lead to high growth rates in labor force age groups and total population. Whether or not this will translate into high economic growth rates is problematic, depending on many other factors. These countries could be a source of large immigration to richer countries.

Poor countries typically have poor infrastructure, poor education and health facilities, diseases and epidemics, parasitic and corrupt political elites and bureaucracies, military coups, and internal violence including civil wars for political control.

INTERREGIONAL CHANGE

The global figures hide big regional differences. About half of the world’s projected population growth between 2022 and 2050 is expected to occur in eight countries, five in Africa (Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania) and three in Asia (India, Pakistan and the Philippines). Africa recently passed the combined populations of the United States and Europe. In 1980, Africa’s population was one-third that of the U.S. and Europe.

Most of the largest and fastest growing urban areas in the world are in populous poor countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria and India. Over half of the world’s population live in cities and the percent is rising. Almost all of the increased population in poor countries will live in or move to cities, which are already ecological disasters – traffic gridlock, poor air quality, lack of adequate infrastructure, sinking, raw sewage, and power outages. Many are coastal cities that are already experiencing periodic flooding and storm surges; rising sea levels and the increased number and severity of hurricanes will intensify urban problems. (See the example of Niger in The Economist (July 1, 2023, 15) for the human side behind the statistics. Niger has one of the highest birth rates in the world.)

Starting sometime in the 2060s, the world’s declining population outside of Africa will equal Africa’s population growth. Africa’s population is expected to grow from about 2.7 billion in the 2060s to about 3.5 billion in 2100. The rest of the world will see population fall from about 7.0 billion in the 2060s to 5.3 billion in 2100, or 1.7 billion. Of this total, about one billion of the decrease will occur in China and India.

The forecast is that the world’s birth rate in 2100 will be below replacement, at 1.66. How soon the world reaches zero population growth will depend critically on when the world’s birth rate falls below replacement, which in turn depends on how fast birth rates decline in Africa.

By 2100, Africa could have about as many people as Asia, about 3.5 billion. Together, Africa and Asia in 2100 could have about 80% of the world’s population. Europe and the United States together will have about 10% of the world’s population. Globally, this will be a world with substantially more people over the age of 65 than under 20 – 2.4 billion vs. 1.7 billion.

There will be significantly different population patterns by region and by country. Many countries in Africa will double or triple in population. Many countries outside of Africa will have a lower population. Some countries, 23 in all, including China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Spain and Bulgaria will see their populations cut in half by 2100.

The remaining populations outside of Africa will also be older. Countries with large population decreases mean old populations, with a high percent of over-65 and a low percent of children. Africa will have the “youngest” regional population, which is one reason that the region’s population can continue to grow even as birth rates fall below replacement.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SPECIFIC REGIONS AND COUNTRIES

The Lancet projections for the six most populous countries in 2100 are India (1·09 billion), Nigeria (791 million), China (750 million), the United States (336 million), and Pakistan (248 million). The projections are probably too high for India and the United States if the birth rate in India continues to fall and the current (2025) immigration and deportation policies of the United States continue.

SUMMARY OF REGIONAL PROJECTIONS

Region	2017 Population	Projected 2100 Population	2017 Birth Rate	Projected 2100 Birth Rate
Africa	1,227	3,504	4.62	1.73
Central Europe	115	52	1.43	1.35
Eastern Europe (Includes Russia)	210	135	1.55	1.45
High Income East Asia	187	94	1.30	1.33
North America	361	380	1.79	1.54
Western Europe	433	375	1.59	1.64
Latin America	582	575	2.18	1.58
South Asia	1,783	1,440	2.27	1.33
Southeast & East Asia	2,159	1,435	1.72	1.61

Lancet

By the end of the century, every region and almost every country will have a birth rate below replacement.

By 2100, Africa could have about as many people as in Asia, about 3.5 billion. Together, Africa and Asia in 2100 could have about 80% of the world’s population. The United States plus all of Europe (including Russia) might have about 10% of the world’s population.

AFRICA

Year	Millions	% Increase	Millions Increase
1960	284	29%
1970	366	29%	82
1980	483	32%	117
1990	644	33%	161
2000	831	29%	187
2010	1,072	29%	241
2020	1,381	29%	309

In 2024, Africa’s population was estimated to be 1,515 million (1½ billion). (UN numbers) Current UN projection is that Africa’s population will increase to about 2.5 billion by 2050 and 3.5 billion in 2100.

Region	2017 Population	Projected 2100 Population	2017 Birth Rate	Projected 2100 Birth Rate
Sub-Sahara	1,026	3,071	4.62	1.73
North Africa	201	433
Africa Total	1,227	3,504

Lancet projections

Between 2010 and 2020, in just 10 years, the African population increased about the same amount as the total population of the United States. The increase in African population in this decade (2020-2030) will probably be greater, despite the impact of Covid. Better vaccines and control methods of malaria, Africa’s health scourge, are being perfected and produced.

Africa is the poorest region in the world. Africa’s population is expected to triple between 2017 and 2100. By the end of the century, Africa will have 40-45% of the world’s population.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s 2024 birth rate is about 4.3 – 4.4 children per woman past child-bearing ages, by far the highest regional birth rate in the world. This number is expected to fall to about 1.7 in 2100. North Africa’s collective birth rate, dominated by Egypt, might be near replacement.

It will still be the highest regional birth rate in the world. Although below replacement, Africa’s population will still be increasing at the end of the century but may be close to its maximum.

Family planning, combined with urbanization and more education of females, could lead to birth rates declining faster than projected in high birth-rate countries. In Africa, Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda promoted family planning and have seen large decreases in their birth rates. Kenya, after investing in family planning clinics and information, has seen its fertility rate fall from 6.5 in the late 1980s to 2.4, marginally above replacement and half the rate of most African countries.

This is a good example of exponential growth. Although the growth rate remains about constant, around 30% per decade (2.4% per year), the 10-year increase in population gets larger as the base increases over time.

The working age population in sub-Saharan Africa will increase by about 700 million (!) by 2050. This will be roughly equal to the current working-age population of China or India. Although Africa will have a large increase in population, its young population will lead to a small percent increase in senior citizens.

Projected populations for the most populous countries are:

Most Populous Countries	2017 Population	Projected 2100 Population	2017 Birth Rate	Projected 2100 Birth Rate
Nigeria	206	790	5.11	1.69
Ethiopia	103	225	4.79	1.33
Egypt	96	200	2.66	2.08
Congo (DRC)	81	245	5.05	1.75
Tanzania	54	185	4.79	1.60

Lancet projections

I find the population number for Nigeria in 2100 astonishing. Nigeria’s population is currently around 230 million and is expected to be about 750-800 million by 2100. In that year, Nigeria’s population is expected to be about equal to China’s population and second only to India’s. The populations of the Congo and Tanzania are expected to triple. (For a detailed look at Nigeria, see Nigeria.)

Africa and some poor countries outside of Africa will have the opposite problem of richer countries and regions. They will have above replacement birth rates for a generation or two. This will lead to high growth rates in labor force age groups and total population. Whether or not this will translate into high economic growth rates is problematic, depending on many other factors. These countries could be a source of large numbers of immigrants to richer countries.

The long-term high birth rates and population growth rates partly explain why from 1970 to 2024 sub-Saharan Africa’s inflation-adjusted (real) GDP per person has not increased. Sub-Saharan population went from 290 million in 1970 to 1.3 billion in 2024, over 2% compounded yearly growth. Real income per person has remained around $1,500. Sub-Saharan’s economic future will partly depend on how fast the current birth rate declines.

RUSSIA

Russia’s population is declining. The UN projection is that Russia’s current population of around 145 million will fall to about 85 million by the end of the century, about a 40% decrease. The Lancet projection is around 105 million, about a 30% decline. Projected future birth rate of 1.43 is about the same as the current birth rate of 1.42.

Russia has avoided a large decrease in its population by encouraging immigration, mostly from former republics of the Soviet Union. While birthrates are below replacement, the decline of the national population has been offset in recent years by immigration. The Lancet projection was made right after a period of large immigration, which has since slowed down. Lower rates of immigration since 2018 have contributed to decreases in population.

Male life expectancies in Russia have been going down for decades but might have recently stabilized (Russian statistics are suspect). Russia was particularly hard hit by Covid because of low levels of vaccination from an ineffective domestically produced vaccine. Russia has the world’s highest per capita consumption of alcohol and poor health care facilities outside of the major cities. The war in Ukraine has resulted in a large number of deaths and serious injuries. Also a large recent migration among educated young male adults, which might affect future population and economic growth projections.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Because of past very low birth rates and high levels of out-migration, central and eastern Europe is looking at population declines in this generation. It is already happening in the Balkan countries. The war in Ukraine has led to millions of emigrants; how many will return is unknown.

Some UN projections show that many countries in central and eastern Europe might have even larger total percent declines than Japan by the end of the century (over 50%). The region as a whole will probably see a population decline of about 50% by 2100 to less than 100 million people (without Russia). This means that the “borderlands” of Europe, a traditional source of violence and target for conquest, will be depopulated. Total population of all of central and eastern Europe might be less than the population of Russia.

WESTERN EUROPE

Western Europe is further along the population aging curve but because of immigration of younger people, the decline will not be as precipitous. Countries in western Europe draw in immigrants from central and eastern European countries in the European Union and from former colonies. And western Europe, like Japan, currently starts with more resources to support an aging population. But high structural unemployment rates, low economic growth, restrictive labor laws and generous early retirement benefits will strain western Europe’s ability to grow and maintain current social welfare levels. A few European countries realize that current levels of social welfare are not sustainable and have begun reviews of government retirement and health care programs. This problem is exacerbated by the currently very high unemployment and underemployment rates among younger employees.

Facing the future, a number of Western European countries have set up programs to encourage legal migration from outside the European Union, in addition to migration from central European countries within the EU. But increase in immigrants is currently being met with increasing domestic opposition and the rise of anti-immigration political parties.

CHINA

Demographics Update (August 8, 2025)

China’s slowly decreasing total population masks rapid and large changes in its age distribution. Between 2021 and 2024, the number of pre-school children (3 to 6 year olds) fell from 48 million to 36 million. The number is expected to fall another 14 million in the next five years as the birth rate of 1.0 is one of the lowest in the world. In contrast, over the same period, the number of people aged 65 and over is projected to rise from 211 million to 256 million, according to UN projections.

China, which enforced a “one-child” program from the 1970s to 2015, has one of the lowest birthrates in the world, around 1.1 (2023) and probably falling. Although the “one-child” program has been relaxed and then abandoned in recent years, the national birthrate is below that of the “one-child” period around 1.5 in the 1990s. The number of children is expected to fall about 50 million from around 2020 to 2035.

China currently has a relatively young average-age population but the average age is rising very rapidly because of the very low long-term birth rates.

China’s total population probably has already reached its peak of 1.4 billion people. The Lancet projection is a decline to about 750 million people in 2100. Thus China will account for most of the global decline of population.

China’s working-age population began shrinking in 2012. By around 2050, the decrease will be about the size of the current U.S. total labor force (170 million).

China has a special problem that could affect future demographics. Chinese youth, ages 19-24, have a very high unemployment rate, probably over 20% and possibly much higher. The government stopped publishing statistics and then came out with a new series with a lower unemployment rate. Colleges graduates in particular are finding it hard to get a decent position; many are unemployed, accepting menial jobs just to earn small amounts of income, or are moving in with relatives. The government’s policy is to tell the unemployed youth to “eat bitterness.”

At a minimum, this will probably affect future demographics and economic growth – lower income, later marriages. This is in addition of a dearth of females because of the past “one child” policy that led to tens of millions of abortions of female embryos and female infanticide.

As in the United States, a stagnant or declining population is not spread evenly across the country. Government policies to help rural and inland areas do not seem to be working. Between 2010 and 2020, 1,240 counties and county-cities out of 1,866 saw their populations shrink, many by up to 35%, as birth rates fell to record lows and people continued to go to cities in search of work.

The Economist, “China’s last boomtowns show rapid growth is still possible,” July 30, 2024.

Next year (2025) the median (half above, half below) age in China will pass that of the United States. China’s over-60 population of over 300 million is already close to the total population of the United States. By around 2050, the over-60 population is projected to be over 500 million, over 35% of China’s total population.

China’s first reaction to this trend has been to slowly raise their low retirement ages over 15 years. For men, the retirement age is being raised from 60 to 63. For women, from 55 to 58 for white-collar workers and from 50 to 55 for blue-collar workers. A related reason is that the public pension costs are “squeezing” government budgets. (The Economist, “The World in Brief,” September 13, 2024).

A mature, experienced workforce should help maintain high but falling economic growth rates for another generation. After about 2050, demographics will begin working against Chinese economic growth.

This policy will be very unpopular. Traditionally, families were multi-generational and children (daughters and daughters-in-law) were expected to care for aging parents. But hundreds of millions of the working-age population have migrated from rural areas to cities, leaving their children in the care of grandparents. A rising percent of women in the cities are working. If retirement ages are raised and grandparents in both the cities and countryside have to work longer, there may be less baby-sitting. This might lower the birth rate even more. In addition, China has strong age discrimination, so that the older population might have to wait longer between being employed and receiving a retirement pension.

China has massive internal migration. It is governed by hukou system, which has roots in Chinese history.

In the hukou system, everyone carries a household registration card with the individual’s place of birth. More than half of China’s population have a rural hukou. Individuals cannot legally change their hukou without official approval. But China’s need for large amounts of labor in cities and industrial areas has created a demand for “illegal” migrants.

The migrants have virtually no rights or legal protection. They have no access to social services, health care or education. Wages are often below the official minimum and they can be “deported” back to their home location at any time.

This creates an exploited underclass similar to illegal immigrants in other countries. The number of rural migrant workers in China is maybe around 300 million, comprising more than one third of the Chinese labor force. Official Chinese 2020 census figures put the rural hukou population at 376 million people.

Rural migrant laborers propelled the extraordinary boom of China’s economy over the last decades but are still subject to discrimination and unfair treatment. Their children are often separated from their parents for years and raised by grandparents. The government is slowly improving the legal status of some rural migrant workers but fears that former rural migrants might lead to higher unemployment in the major cities.

The minimum government-funded pension has been raised to about $22 a month. Migrant workers receive lower pension than those registered as city residences. They average about $28 a month. The government is slowly allowing some long-term hukou workers in cities to qualify for the higher pensions of city residents.

Statista, “Migrant workers in China – statistics and facts,” June 3, 2024.

The Economist, “Sunset Delayed,” September 21, 2024, 38-40.

EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA – GROWING OLD BEFORE GETTING RICH

Most countries in East Asia are “middle-income” countries, with per capita income of $7,000 or less. They are becoming “aged” societies (14% of population over 65) with 1/5 to 1/10 the per capita income that Japan had when it reached this level.

South Korea has the lowest birth rate in the world of 0.7, followed by Taiwan with a birth rate of 0.87. Taiwan’s total population has already stopped growing.

Because of low birth rates in the past, these countries are aging rapidly, more rapidly than rich countries like Japan, western Europe and the United States did in the past.

South Korea and Taiwan are looking at demographic futures similar to Japan’s. South Korea’s current population of 51 million is expected to decline to 30 million or less by 2100. Taiwan’s population is expected to fall from 24 million currently to 11 million in 2100 despite a slight increase in the birth rate.

Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam are expected to have different trajectories. Indonesia, with a current population of 260 million and a birth rate close to replacement, might have about the same or slightly lower population in 2100. The Philippines has a high birth rate (3.2) and might see its population go from 105 million now to 170 million in 2100. Against this increase is the probability that the Philippines will continue to have high rates of emigration. Vietnam, with a current population of around 100 million, is expected to experience a decline to about 75 million in 2100.

Looking at Asia as a whole, “Asia will account for 70% of the expected increase in senior citizens in poor countries by 2050.” (The Economist, “Old before their time,” October 14, 2023, 31)

These countries, like China, are transitioning from having mature, experienced labor forces to retirement. A large mature labor force is good for economic growth. It is problematic how a country with a rapidly increasing percent of its population in the retirement ages will continue to experience economic growth.

As in China, families have been a traditional source of care for the elderly. This is starting to break down as children migrate to the cities and more women have entered the labor force. Governments have been slow to provide support for their aging populations, although this is starting to change.

SOUTH ASIA: INDIA, BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN

India has a population of 1.4 billion people, about the same as China. The two countries together contain 35% of the world’s total population.

Unlike China, India’s population is expanding. The Lancet projection is that India will reach a maximum population of around 1.6 billion in 2048 and then begin falling to 1.1 billion in 2100. Thus, by 2100, India and China will account for a decrease of about one billion people from today’s total.

India’s birth rate is around 2.1, just at or above the replacement rate. Lancet’s projection is a continuous fall in India’s birth rate, reaching 1.3 in 2100.

India, like China, experiences massive internal migration. Based on a recent census, India has approximately 450 million internal migrants. They are mostly from the poorer north going to the richer south, replacing the south’s aging labor force.

Bangladesh’s population is around 160 million people. Lancet expects its population to decrease to about 80 million by 2100, a 50% decline. Bangladesh’s current birth rate is just below replacement but is expected to fall to 1.2 in 2100.

Pakistan is another populous country, with 215 million people. It also has a high birth rate, at 3.4. After reaching a peak population of about 315 million in 2062, Pakistan’s population is expected to fall to about 250 million in 2100, with a low birth rate of 1.3.

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America’s population of 582 million in 2100 is about the same as today. But without Mexico, Latin America’s population would decrease by 50 million.

Lancet projections for the largest countries in Latin America:

Latin America	582	575		2.18	1.58
Most Populous Countries	2017 Population	Projected 2100 Population	2017 Birth Rate	Projected 2100 Birth Rate
Brazil	212	165	1.76	1.44
Mexico	127	145	2.42	1.44
Columbia	51	47	2.12	1.45
Argentina	44	48	2.17	1.62
Total	434	405

The following is mostly a summary of The Economist, “Continent of discontent,” September 7, 2019, 81.

Gallup polls reveal that 31% of the population in Latin America want to leave their countries, about the same percent of the people polled in Africa and the Middle East. Latin Americans are fed up with violence and poverty, especially in southern Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Over 4 million people – about 13% of the population – have already left Venezuela. There have been recessions in Brazil and Argentina, in addition to 64,000 murders in Brazil in 2017. Drug gangs are a threat in many Latin American cities and countries. Much of the post-war increase in income and wealth has gone to a small percent of the population, a reason for the recent demonstrations in Chile. Overall, Latin America has had little economic growth since 2015.

Corruption is everywhere. 80% of those polled in Latin America think their government is corrupt. According to another poll, “the share of Latin Americans dissatisfied with how democracy works in their country has risen from 52% in 2010 to 71% in 2018.”

Since 2018, autocratic populists who campaigned against corruption and crime won presidential elections in Brazil (a conservative), Mexico (a leftist) and other countries. Argentina has elected an outsider who promises major changes in a society racked by high rates of inflation.

If voters remain disenchanted and disgusted, more autocratic leaders are likely to be elected. And emigration pressure on U.S. southern borders will increase.

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APPENDIX

Lancet Methodology (Quoted from the authors of the Lancet study)

We modelled future population in reference and alternative scenarios as a function of fertility, migration, and mortality rates. We developed statistical models for completed cohort fertility at age 50 years (CCF50). Completed cohort fertility is much more stable over time than the period measure of the total fertility rate (TFR). We modelled CCF50 as a time-series random walk function of educational attainment and contraceptive met need. Age-specific fertility rates were modelled as a function of CCF50 and covariates. We modelled age-specific mortality to 2100 using underlying mortality, a risk factor scalar, and an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model. Net migration was modelled as a function of the Socio-demographic Index, crude population growth rate, and deaths from war and natural disasters; and use of an ARIMA model. The model framework was used to develop a reference scenario and alternative scenarios based on the pace of change in educational attainment and contraceptive met need. We estimated the size of gross domestic product for each country and territory in the reference scenario. Forecast uncertainty intervals (UIs) incorporated uncertainty propagated from past data inputs, model estimation, and forecast data distributions.

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For two detailed studies, see

Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States

Demographics and Population Projections of Japan

Also see

Nigeria

China’s Economy, Politics, and Demography

October 15, 2025

Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States

Americans

SUMMARY

Population projections and demographic changes, especially in the different age cohorts, should be seen along with large annual fiscal

deficits and the large and increasing national debt. The connection is the forecasts of large increases in the over-65 age group and the shrinking working age (and tax-paying) age group.

This essay should be read along with Government Finance 101. Fiscal Policy: Welcome to Alice in Wonderland.

UPDATE (November 2025)

Combining the recent changes in the birth rate and net

immigration, plus the “baked-in” projection that Americans over the age of 65 will increase by about 50 million by 2060 (see below), it seems likely that the number of Americans in the working ages cohort (15-64) will decrease at least 40 million by 2060. From about 230 million in 2025 to 190 million in 2060. Well before then, it seems likely that America, like other wealthy countries, will have extensive temporary worker permit programs to augment the native-born work force. This will probably be combined with much more extensive use of generative AI algorithms to handle much of the information analysis in organizations combined with greatly increased use of industrial robots.

UPDATE (October 2025)

Projections are changing rapidly because of the dramatic change in net immigration and a slight but continuous fall in the birth rate. Past long run projections, assuming historic levels of immigration, now seem high.

In January, the CBO’s projections showed “without immigration the population would shrink beginning in 2033” if birth rates stayed at current low levels. Without immigration, the CBO now expects the US population to start shrinking in 2031. If there is net negative immigration – more deportations and immigrants leaving the US – CBO projections indicate that the population may reach zero growth as early as around 2028.

At least half of immigrants, about 6 million, have entered the country in the last four years with some protection from immediate deportation, especially under asylum status. This protection is being withdrawn, even from immigrants who have been granted asylum status in the past.

There are some estimates that the total immigration population of the US is falling, about 1.5 million over the last year. This may indicate net negative immigration.

Since immigrants tend to be young adults and have a higher birth rate than the US-born population, lower levels of immigration, mass deportations, and voluntary leaving of immigrants could lower the projected birth rates.

UPDATE (September 2025)

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has updated its population projections based on a lower birth rate and lower net immigration. “The CBO projects that the U.S. population will increase from 350 million in 2025 to 367 million in 2055. Deaths will be greater than births starting around 2031; the gap gets larger over time. So all population growth after 2031 will be from net immigration. If net immigration falls to zero, the U.S. population will stop growing in 2031 and start a slow decrease after then.

UPDATE (August 2025)

Recent data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention show the U.S. birth rate has fallen below 1.6, the lowest rate on record. With a falling birth rate, far fewer legal and illegal immigrants and increasing deportations, the United States is now on the same demographic falling population path as most other industrialized and industrializing countries.

Reported in The Economist, “America’s fertility crash reaches a new low,” August 5, 2025.

OVERVIEW OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

The longer-run projection is a population of about 335 million people in 2100 (Lancet), about the same number as today. This projection was made with data up to 2017. There is a very wide range of uncertainty around this projection, partly depending on future birth rates and levels of immigration.

The U.S. birth rate is a little over 1.6, below the replacement level of 2.1. This is in line with some industrialized countries but higher than Japan, China, South Korea, and most European countries. If the birth rate stays about the same and there is little or no net immigration, the Lancet projection is too high. The U.S. maximum population may occur much sooner.

According to the Census Bureau, by 2030, one in five Americans will be 65 or older, which is up from less than one in 10 in 1960.

By 2060, the Population Reference Bureau expects the number of Americans 65 and older to more than double from 46 million today to over 98 million.

In less than two decades, older adults are set to outnumber kids for the first time in US history.

Because of demographics, the United States could have a relatively better economic future than almost any other industrial or industrializing country. Almost all these countries will experience declining populations (if levels of immigration do not substantially increase), many with population decreases of 30-50%. Also, most of these countries will have higher dependency ratios (a higher percent of old people) than the U.S. That is, the U.S. will have a relatively younger population. This is partly due to higher birth rates and high rates of immigration into the U.S. since the 1960s. With the current birth rate, the United States will reach maximum population later than the other industrial or developing countries.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF AMERICA: POPULATION PROJECTIONS

For generations, demographers considered America exceptional. High levels of immigration and relatively high fertility rates increased its population faster, and kept it more youthful, then its rich country peers in Europe. Americans within their borders were also exceptionally mobile.

America has had high population growth rates since the first immigrants. (For a detailed look at immigration in colonial times, see American Colonial History, 1607-1775) Since becoming a country, America’s population has gone from 4 million in 1790 (the first census) to 30 million in 1860 to the current (7/24) population of 343 million. The main reasons for America’s high population growth rates in the past have been high birth rates, immigration, relatively healthy and well-fed population, and industrialization (economic development and growth).

The period from 1950 to 2000 was unusual.

Population during this period was:

Year	Population Millions	Decade Increase Millions	Decade % Increase
1950	152
1960	176	24	16%
1970	200	24	12
1980	223	23	12
1990	248	25	11
2000	282	34	14
2010	311	29	10
2020	339	28	9

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,

World Population Prospects, The 2024 Revisions

Between 1950 and 2000, the U.S. population almost doubled. The American “baby boom” started after World War II, temporarily reversing the long-term decline in birth rates. In the middle of this period, partly due to more effective and more available birth control, starting around 1970, birth rates began a rapid decline. That was partly offset by an increase in immigration.

Since 2000, population growth rates have slowed. The 2020-2030 population growth rates will probably be lower, maybe around 6% for the decade, because of Covid, lower birth rates, and lower net migration rates (fewer immigrants and more past migrants leaving the United States).

The U.S. population at the beginning of 2024 was 343 million.

The UN projection continues:

2040 – 370 million

2050 – 381 million

2070s – 400 million

2100 – 421 million

The projected population in 2050 is only 11 million higher than 2040, a decade increase of only 3%. It is also 38 million people higher than 2024, an average increase of about 4-5% per decade.

After the 2070, the U.S. population will increase by less than one million per year. (United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2024 Revision.) These projections are high and like past United Nations projections will probably be lower in the future.

The alternative projection from Lancet expects the U.S. population to peak at 365 million in 2062 and then decline to 335 million in 2100, about the same number as today.

There is a very wide range of uncertainty around this projection, depending on future birth rates and levels of immigration. These projections were made from a starting point of higher birth rates and higher immigration numbers before Covid and current immigration and deportation policies. Birth rates have not returned to pre-Covid levels.

The U.S. birth rate has been around or slightly below replacement since 1975. The current (2024) U.S. birth rate at 1.62 is the lowest since records began in 1909. The population growth rate is 0.5% a year is low and falling. The 2025 population growth rate is expected to be around 0.2%.

About half of the decline in the birth rate since 1990 has been due to fewer teenage pregnancies.

Without past immigration and the children of immigrants, the U.S. population and labor force growth rate would have been lower in the past 40 years. And more of the total growth would have been in the over-65 age group. Immigrants tend to be young adults. If net immigration is zero or below, America’s birth rate will continue to fall.

The over-65 population is expected to double in the next 35 years, from 46 million now to over 98 million in 2060. (Population Reference Bureau) All of the total population increase will be in the over-65 group; the number of people under 65 will decline. This will increase the ratio of the over-65 age group to the prime labor force age group of 18-64. Again, depending on immigration, since immigrants tend to be younger than the native population.

Like other industrialized countries, older adults are expected to outnumber children (under 18) in less than two decades. (Population Reference Bureau)

The current birth rate is now about the same or slightly higher than that of many industrial countries. This might be partly due to the effects of Covid, although the current birth rate is the same as the birth rate during the Covid years of 2020-2022. But because of past immigration and its demographic effects, the long run decline in America’s population and the labor force should be less than most other industrialized countries.

The partial abortion ban will have little effect on future population growth. The number of abortions was going down even before the ban. Abortions are still legal in many states. Abortion pills accounted for over half of abortions before the ban. In Europe, pills account for about 70% of abortions.

The United States has a special problem. Because of the opioid/fentanyl epidemic and suicide, America’s adult mortality rate is increasing, mostly among white men under 55. A 15-year-old white male’s probability of dying before the age of 50 is now higher in America than in Bangladesh. The good news is that while still high, deaths from opioids and fentanyl are going down. The bad news is that a new, more powerful drug than fentanyl has begun to show up.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FUTURE SIZE OF THE LABOR FORCE

With birth rates below replacement, the future size of the labor force will depend critically on immigration. Future productivity increases will partly depend on immigrants’ young age composition, birth rate, and education and training.

The current (2024/25) unemployment rate is near a post-World War II low. The labor crunch is likely to persist for some time. The Pew Research Center projects no or very little growth in the working-age population over the next two decades. If the United States were to cut off the flow of new immigrants, Pew noted, the American working-age population would shrink.

The U.S. economy is growing at about 2-2½ percent a year. Employment is growing at about 1.0-1.5% a year; productivity is growing at about one percent a year. The size of the labor force (employed plus unemployed) is growing at about 0.3% per year; the growth rate is in long-term decline and may accelerate with a possible decrease of immigrant workers. This indicates that the growth in employment will probably be lower in the future than in the past.

The US youth (16-24 years old) labor force participation rate is dropping. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that only 53.1% of young people (ages 16-24) were employed during the summer of 2025, about 15 percentage points less than in 2000. This might also lead to delayed marriages and family formation. This could affect the demand for housing.

This is puzzling. The minimum wage is much higher. College graduates have large amounts of student loan debt. Both of these should indicate higher labor force participation rates. But currently (second half of 2025), companies, based with uncertainty due to randomly changing tariffs, higher interest rates, and uncertainty about future consumption expenditures, are not hiring new entrants to the labor force.

One possibility is that traditional employers of young people, such as restaurants, are cutting back on total employment and also substituting automation.

Periods of high youth dropping out and unemployment are historically correlated with increases in social instability, drug use, crime, and political extremism.

Ed D’Agostino, “Unemployment’s Slow Burn,” October 10, 2025.

There’s another variable, one highlighted in The Wall Street Journal. Suzy Welch wrote an important commentary based on her research on Gen Z at NYU Stern School of Business. This group was born between 1997 and 2012, making them 13 to 28 years old today. Welch, former editor of the Harvard Business Review, took a look at Gen Z’s values. She found a stark disconnect between their values and those sought by today’s businesses.

Welch reports that only about 2% of Gen Z prioritize the values most employers seek—achievement, learning, and a strong drive to work. Instead, Gen Z places higher value on selfcare, authenticity, and helping others—commendable values on their own, but when they are your top priorities, you might find it hard to thrive at work.

Another possible source of disconnect of the young is the addictive attraction of the internet, especially video games, for males. Some researchers believe this is also the reason that male academic achievement is below female achievement and the gap is widening.

Combined with the high use of illegal drugs, these factors might help explain the dropout rate and lack of traditional values.

Most of the recent increase in the size of the labor force has been in the over-55 age group. This is the fastest growing age group and more older Americans are living longer, healthier, and working past retirement age. Also, millions of Americans own small businesses and apparently do not automatically retire just because they turn 65. Others have technical skills (tax accountants, dentists, various types of data analysts) that allow them to continuing working, often part-time or online.

There has been little increase in total employment in the under-55 age group. There are studies that suggest an aging labor force causes slower productivity growth. Also, possibly, less innovation. This may be a factor in the decline of new business formation.

Like other wealthy countries, economic growth will depend on productivity increases. Productivity growth in the ten years of this economic expansion (since 2009, before Covid) was the lowest for any ten-year period since the end of World War II. It is possible, however, that government statistics are not picking up the productivity increases from innovations in information technology.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION

The following report from 2015 shows how important immigration has been from the 1960s to the date of the report. This is in contrast to the situation since Covid and the Trump campaign against immigration.

According to a 2015 Pew Research Center report, “Immigrants and their children will represent 36 percent of the U.S. population in 2065, which equals or surpasses the peak levels last seen around the turn of the 20th century. That share will represent a doubling since 1965 (18 percent) and a notable rise from today’s 26 percent.” Pew estimates that as of March 2025, immigrants and their U.S.-born children comprise about 28% of the U.S. population, totaling over 93 million people. These projections are now in doubt because of the drastic reduction of immigrants seeking permanent residence.

The report states that “the arrival of new immigrants and the births of their children and grandchildren accounted for 55 percent of the U.S. population increase since 1964…The projections also show that 88 percent of the increase in population until 2065 is linked to future immigrants and their descendants.”

Over the last two decades, immigrants and their children accounted for more than half the growth of the population of 25- to 64-year-olds, according to the Pew analysis. Over the next 20 years, immigrants and their children will have to make up for the net deficit in the labor force left by the retirement of the baby boom generation. If immigration were to continue at recent levels, around 2050 the United States would have the lowest percent of retirement-age population of any developed country. Even lower than China. This means more tax-paying workers per retired person than any other industrialized country.

Immigration over the last 50 years has impacted American demographics. The American population continues to grow despite below replacement birthrates of native-born inhabitants. Immigrants tend to be young, increasing the size of the workforce and slowing the increase of the average age of the population. The education and skills they bring is a “free lunch” for the American economy. A high percent of Americans who have won Nobel prizes were immigrants or the children of immigrants.

Immigrants and their children have traditionally provided a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs. “Immigrants start companies at twice the rate of native Americans. Almost half the companies in the Fortune 500 were started by immigrants or their children.” (Austan Goolsbee, “Sharp Cuts in Immigration Threaten U.S. Economy,” New York Times Sunday Business, October 13, 2019, 4). One of the founders of Google was from Russia. The current CEOs of Microsoft and Google are from India and the CEOs of Nvidia and AMD are from Taiwan.

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND STATISTICS

Currently, there are 9 million people in the United States with green cards, which means they are on a path to citizenship. During the Biden administration, about 3.5 million people became naturalized citizens, almost one million a year. (New York Times, “Immigrants are Becoming U.S. Citizens at Fastest Clip in Years,” August 12, 2024, From the photos in the article, it appears a high percent are young people.)

America has an estimated 11-14 million illegal immigrants. But this is more complicated than the political rhetoric and sensationalist journalism indicates. Many would have eventually attain some type of legal status leading to permanent residence; less now because of deportations and blocking the part to residence and citizenship.

The United States does not have a coherent immigration policy. The last immigration law was passed in 1990. Attempts to modernize immigration policy has been stymied because of difference between Democrats and Republicans.

The Trump administration reduced legal immigration and plans to make it difficult for foreign, especially Chinese, students to attend American colleges. In the past, foreign students who remained in the United States were a major source of scientists, technology workers and entrepreneurs. Over half of the science, math and engineering graduate students in the U.S. are from foreign countries.

Discouraging immigration, limiting foreign work visas, and foreign graduate students will reduce major sources of American innovation, technology entrepreneurs, and productivity growth in the future. It will also eliminate the major source of the overall growth in the labor force.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Immigration over the last 50 years has impacted American demographics. The American population continues to grow despite below replacement birth rates of native-born inhabitants. Immigrants tend to be young, increasing the size of the workforce. The education and skills they bring is a “free lunch” for the American economy. On the other hand, the increasing number of older Americans will make it difficult to reduce yearly deficits and fund programs for economic growth.

The changing demographics of the United States may be influencing other variables besides economic growth. Changing demographics might interact in the future with changing social

attitudes, global warming and how to combat it, and America’s foreign policy.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Immigration since 1960 has changed the ethnic and racial composition of America. Latinos make up about 20% of American population; Asians about 10%. There are about twice as many Latinos than blacks; there are almost as many Asians as blacks. This will change the influence of minority groups. (New York Times, February 22, 2021).

The continuing change in the age distribution of the population will have political and economic consequences. For example, when the Social Security trust fund runs out around 2034 (maybe earlier), benefits will drop by at least 20%. With seniors on Social Security making up a large minority of voters, the government will probably make up the shortfall out of general tax revenue. This could increase federal yearly deficits or there would be less money for other programs.

Fewer taxpayers in the future will have to support the greatly increased public health care costs of an aging population living longer.

It could be that the United States will have a better economic future than almost any other country because of demographics. That partly depends on future immigration policies. And there probably will be internal political conflict over the distribution of income by age group.

SUMMARY

With labor force growth rates falling and productivity not increasing, the labor force aging, and legal immigration restricted, long-term U.S. economic growth rates may be lower in the future – below 2% – than currently. Increases in per capita income will depend on productivity increases from new technology, including the widespread application of robotics, new business software, artificial intelligence, and technology developed in the future. It is too early to predict what the long-run impact of artificial intelligence will be on economic growth and employment.

SOURCES:

S.E. Vollcet et. al., “Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study,” Lancet, July 14, 2020, 1285-1306. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0140-6736(20)30677-2.

Probably the best estimates of long-run population projections. Also includes “uncertainty internals” (two standard deviations from mean estimate). They become wider the further out the projection.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,

World Population Prospects, The 2024 Revisions

The United Nations population projections used here are the most recent “medium,” most likely projections. They are lower than the UN projections made two years earlier. It is likely that future UN projections will revise population numbers downward.

Pew Research Center

Particularly strong on immigration data and analysis

United States Census Bureau (census.gov)

Statistica

Population Reference Bureau

Worldometer (for current figures)

Numerous articles in The Economist

Again, population projection and demographic changes should be thought of in connection with government deficits:

Government Finance 101. Fiscal Policy: Welcome to Alice in Wonderland.

For population projections and analysis for Japan and the world, see

Demographics and Population Projections of Japan

In contrast to the United States and other countries, Japan is further along the declining population and labor force curve than almost any other country and may be a preview of the future of many countries outside of Africa. Japan has the world’s oldest population. There is limited but rising immigration, which has triggered a political backlash.

For an analysis of global demographics and long-run population projections, see

Global Demographics and Population Projections

Demographics and Economic Growth

For a look at current global and American use of industrial and humanoid robots, see

Robots. “It’s Alive.”

Includes some (hopefully) satirical comments about the future use of robots.

October 13, 2025

Nigeria

Lagos – Over 30 Million People

POPULATION

This case study of Nigeria, building on

Global Demographics and Population Projections

illustrates the problems that recently-independent countries, especially in Africa, have had. Rapid population growth has made it difficult to deal with these problems in the past; continued large population growth in the future will be even more burdensome.

Nigeria became independent in 1960. Its population was 45 million people. In 2024 its population was 233 million people. Nigeria’s capital, Lagos, is already one of the largest cities in the world. In 2050 its projected population will be in the range of 375-400 million people, depending on how fast its birth rate continues to come down. Around that year Nigeria will replace the United States as the third most populous country in the world.

By 2100, Nigeria is projected to have at least 750 million people, which will be about equal to the projected population of China.

Nigeria’s birth rate in 2023 was 4.5, substantially higher than the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. Although the birth rate is down from the high of 6.9 in 1979, it is still one of the highest in the world. Government programs to reduce the birth rate are part of health care programs, which are being cut back because the stopping of U.S. aid for health care, which includes birth control programs.

ECONOMY

This forms the backdrop for discussing Nigeria’s current problems and prospects for economic growth and development. One conclusion is obvious: Nigeria will need very high and sustained economic growth rates to overcome the rapid increase in population and increase the country’s real per capita income.

Nigeria’s economy still depends on oil; Nigeria is a major oil exporter. Real per capita income goes up and down with the price of oil. Economic statistics tend to indicate that real per capita income has not increased in decades.

One of the successful areas of economic growth is telecommunications. About 90% of the population has mobile phones and about 25% have internet access. Data center capacity is expanding.

Nigeria is forming economic ties with China. In June-August 2025, Chinese exports rose almost 60%. The increase was tied to Chinese Belt and Road infrastructure projects in the country, led by demand for equipment to build Chinese-financed railroads and power generation.

ELECTRICITY

A crucial reason for the lack of economic growth has been the government’s failure to provide enough dependable electricity.

The electricity power grid is owned and operated by the government. Of Nigeria’s 233 million people, over 90 million do not have access to electricity. Nigeria’s electricity production per person is one of the lowest in the world. Long term underinvestment results in frequent blackouts and shortages. Many users, including the government, do not pay their electricity bills; revenue accounts for about 65% of operating costs.

Private gas-powered generators generate more than twice as much electricity as the power grid. Nigerians’ spending on off-grid power is equal to 60% of the government’s entire budget. Cities suffer from noise and air pollution.

Over half of the country’s manufacturing sector is not connected. New data centers have to provide their own power.

There are plans to build off-grid solar and other renewable energy projects. Even if successful, they will not close Nigeria’s massive electricity shortage. And if successful, there will probably be fewer customers on the grid, making it even harder to expand and modernize it.

Government energy policy seems inconsistent; it would like to have solar projects connected to the grid, but it is also thinking about banning solar panel imports.

This discussion of electricity is based on The                            Economist, “A nation in the dark,” May 10, 2025,        38.

Unless banned, roof-top solar panel installations will probably increase rapidly. The price of Chinese exported solar panels has fallen over 50% in the last three years because of overcapacity and price wars.

China has built a high-speed rail line between two suburbs.

POLITICAL

Nigeria’s borders were established by England, Nigeria’s colonial master, in 1898. England combined several kingdoms into an arbritary

administrative area.

The largest ethnic group – Hausa – makes up about 30% of the population. But there are about 275 distinct ethnic groups and about 500 languages and dialects. The population is about evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. Muslims predominate in the north, Christians in the south. There is resentment in the north that the south has benefited more from the oil wealth. The Muslim population, with a higher birth rate, is increasing its share of the total population.

Nigeria has had a tumultuous political history since independence. National politics has been dominated by military coups, fighting among top military officers for power, and brutal military governments. Civilian governments have tended to be corrupt. 2023 was the first national election in Nigeria’s history where no “civilian” candidate was not a former military ruler.

There was a brutal civil war shortly after independence. The predominantly Muslim region in the north is experiencing jihadist terrorism.

Politics has suffered from widespread corruption and the inability to support economic development beyond oil extraction. The country suffers from high inflation and large government fiscal deficits.

OTHER TOPICS

The oil producing region of Nigeria is one of the most polluted areas in the world.

As farmers attempt to expand food production, the result has been massive deforestation as bad as in the Amazon. Even with this, food production has not kept up with population growth. Nigeria has gone from being a net food exporter to a net food importer.

According to Doctors Without Borders, there is widespread malnutrition in northern Nigeria.

Global warming has made producing food more difficult. It is one reason for the large rural migration to the cities.

=====================================

For a discussion of Africa’s demographics and future population, see the essay cited above.

Global Demographics and Population Projections

There are other essays on demographics and population projections for the global economy and individual countries.

Demographics, Immigration and Future Economic Growth of the United States

Demographics and Population Projections of Japan

For a variety of essays, with links, on this blog, see

List of Post by Topics

October 12, 2025
The Prince in a Democracy

Niccolo Machiavelli

It is customary for those who wish to gain the favor of a prince to endeavor to do so by offering him gifts of those things which they hold most precious.

  Niccolò Machiavelli

THE MIND OF THE PRINCE

The only goal of a Prince is to get and keep power.

Others may lust after wealth or prestige but all that matters to the Prince is power.

Power is the only reality. Information is just a tool to support and increase power.

Power is personal. The Prince’s interests are the country’s interests.

The Prince sees society divided in three groups – supporters, enemies, and the silent, fearful politically passive.

Politics is a zero-sum game. You win, your enemies lose. There are no democratic negotiations or compromises. Only temporary alliances that can be broken.

BUILDING YOUR POLITICAL BASE

You share with your supporters a deeply negative view of the future of society. Your supporters see a bright past compared to a dark future. You share this vision. You tell them that only you can fight against or reverse this trend.

You share their belief that the present is corrupt, there are “corrupt elites,” and the future is bleak because of conspiracies. An important part of your appeal is to find or invent conspiracies. You find scapegoats to blame for what your supporters believe is wrong with society.

You find political allies who will support you. Established churches or conservative religious groups are an obvious choice. Many believe in the presence of hidden evil forces.

You do not have to share their beliefs; it is probable you are not religious and do not share their moral teachings. All you have to do is to articulate their moral outrage and support their moral programs. You politicize their beliefs. Like the cynical Richard III of Shakespeare, carry a Bible in public or some other religious photo op. Appear with religious leaders. Speak at their national conventions. Appear on the TV programs of televangelists.

Your political enemies are not the “loyal opposition” of a democracy. They are the enemy. They are the enemy of your supporters. The only legitimate citizens are your supporters. They are “the people.” Your enemies are “enemies of the people.” Your enemies are not just wrong but immoral and evil, a threat to your supporters’ vision of the desired order of society. You denounce your enemies as criminals, traitors, subversives, radicals, elitists, “scum.” You demonize and dehumanize them.

Ignore opinion polls and approval rating polls. The only opinions that count are the opinions of the segment of the population that supports you.

You probably have contempt for people. You only see their negative side – their weaknesses – that you exploit. You feel superior. But you must hide this and transform this feeling into an image of infallibility that will give your supporters strength and purpose.

GETTING ELECTED

The Prince, to be secure, must corrupt the government. You must subvert democratic institutions so you have nothing to fear from defenders of democracy.

To get power, a Prince has to convince about half of the voting citizens to support him. All of his energy and tactics are to increase the number of his supporters. Ignore debate with those who will never support you. Don’t argue with your opponents. Use irrational, emotional appeals against logical, rational arguments. You can ignore, or ridicule, opponents who believe in the rules of debate or fair play.

You can deal with them after you are elected.

Who are your potential supporters?

A democratic society is probably also capitalist. That means permanent disruption, both economic and social. A disproportionate share of the innovators, entrepreneurs and disruptors will come from ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, often immigrants. The dominant racial or ethnic or religious group will feel threatened with an absolute or relative loss of income, status, influence, and power. They will feel insecure, threatened, angry, and hateful. They may use the rhetoric of moral outrage, which you adopt. They see the traditional order of things threatened or slipping away. They start talking about “real citizens.” They are your potential supporters.

Your supporters do not want to hear about tolerance, accommodation to other views or behavior, protection of minorities, human rights, free speech, or individual liberties that protect what is to them abhorrent behavior. Social issues are seen through a traditional moral lens.

It is not necessary that you share their beliefs. It is only necessary that you recognize their beliefs about what they think is wrong and who is to blame. If you gain power, you must articulate their discontent and focus it.

You create a narrative of a past “Golden Age” or a historical mythology. You appeal to their ethnic or racial pride.

KEEPING AND EXPANDING POWER

Princes in a democracy depend on and represent the reactionary forces that cannot or do not wish to face the future. You do not have to have any positive programs to deal with society’s problems. Reward your supporters with grants and subsidies. Place blame. Deny the problems exist. Your power and influence do not depend on constructive or “progressive” programs to deal with your country’s future.

It is necessary that attacks on opponents, liberals, and potential rivals be continuous and incessant. In a world of social media, it is necessary to control the narrative. To do this, all statements, no matter how outrageous, should demonize, dehumanize, and demoralize the opposition. They should always be kept on the defensive.

You can tell the truth or you can lie. You can change your story without explanation. It doesn’t matter. All that matters is that you constantly talk about the themes important to your supporters.

You must dominate the discussion. Overwhelm opponents with a constant barrage of propaganda and misinformation. Don’t stop to debate. Your supporters will accept whatever you say on faith.

Many of the opposition politicians and their supporters are the “new classes” prospering because of economic opportunity and disruption. Your supporters probably felt superior to them in the past but now feel threatened by them. You play upon those fears. You appeal to their sense of nostalgia, how they imagine things were in the past. At the same time, extort money from corporations and the wealthy by threatening them with the powers of your government. Attack and weaken other institutions you believe are actual or potential threats to your power or influence.

It is not necessary to build a new political base. You will find that many politicians will support you if you have gained power. You will probably view them with contempt because of their weakness and flattery but it doesn’t matter if they do your bidding. If they question some of your actions or begin to appear to be a threat to your power, they must be destroyed. They can always be replaced with new sycophants.

CORRUPTING DEMOCRACY

Keep democratic institutions but “hollow” them out. Subvert the election process so your supporters are almost guaranteed to win. Discredit, indict, or prosecute leading opposition politicians.

The large bureaucracy of government is a powerful tool you can use.  You use the powers of government to destroy or neutralize opponents. The economic and military resources of a country are used to support or increase your power. Gain control of the “judicial” parts of government. Use criminal charges, civil investigations, threatening government prosecutions, taking away grants and subsidizes, destroying reputations, tax audits, and intimidation to weaken your opponents.

Democratic institutions and norms are established to protect the political system from demagogues like you. Ignore them or subvert them. Keep the institutions but change the content. Make sure the legislature is dominated by your supporters. Appoint the judges and federal law enforcers. All government departments, all government employees, must be loyal to you, not to some abstract belief in democracy or justice or the common good. There is no common good. They are there to carry out, to justify, whatever actions you decide to take. Everyone is replaceable; loyalty is the only criterion. If things go wrong, find scapegoats. Question motives and patriotism. Denounce and dismiss anyone in your government that doesn’t do your bidding. Everyone in government must feel insecure and only dependent on your goodwill.

You probably have developed personal resentments and grievances. Some may coincide with those of supporters. This suggests targets for your retribution. Also attack real or imagined opponents at random. This will install fear in actual or potential critics.

Strike at targets randomly. No one will feel safe. Install fear in everyone. Everyone has something to lose. The populace will become politically passive to avoid your wrath.

All political rhetoric and moves are tactical. You do not have to have any consistent or long run strategy. You will be in power for only a limited number of years.

Some democracies have term limits. You may not want to give up power after your term of office is finished. Term limits can often be ignored or changed. You might challenge the legality of the term limit law. Or you might promote a flunky as your successor and dominate him. Get elected to another position of power to influence or dominate.

Promote the wealth and power of relatives, especially children. Increase the chances that they may become Princes in the future.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The same thing in foreign affairs. You do not promote democratic values, human rights, individual liberties. Foreign politics is about power, realpolitik. But your power, not your country’s.

Use patriotism and nationalism to gain support. Display your patriotism at every opportunity. Find real or imaged foreign scapegoats for your country’s problems. Divert blame to foreign governments for your country’s problems.

Form alliances with other Princes. Criticize and subvert democracy in other countries. Portray democratic leaders of other countries as weak and indecisive.

If you become the leader of a powerful country, conduct foreign policy like domestic policy. The goal of foreign policy is to increase your domestic power, whether or not it helps your country in foreign affairs. Foreigners don’t vote. And foreigners are a good source of scapegoats. It is easy to conjure up foreign conspiracies for your supporters. If you can link them, no matter how absurdly with domestic opponents, all’s the better.

It is probably a good idea to avoid wars because of uncertain outcomes and consequences. But not always. Regardless, appeal to nationalism and use patriotic rhetoric. You go to war if you believe it will increase your country’s power and influence. Or territory. This implies going to war against weaker opponents.

Beware of other Princes. They share your outlook about human nature and power. Beat up on foreign rulers who still believe in democracy, fairness, and reason.

Many countries with democratic institutions are dominated by the military or corrupt politicians. Older democracies are under attack by “far-right” (autocratic) parties and leaders. They are your natural allies. Support them. Justify their behavior. If they are elected, they might become your ally. But be careful; they think like you.

IF YOU RETIRE

Remember that you will not be around to be criticized when the consequences of your actions come due. Not your problem. The future ends the day you leave office.

Do not worry about your “historical legacy.” History doesn’t judge; historians do. Given enough time and distance, historians find virtues in the most despicable and destructive of leaders. They will accept your written propaganda. They are usually timid academics who worship power. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be spending their time writing about Princes.

If you retire to write your autobiography, also become a gardener. Gardeners ruthlessly control their plantings. Gardening will put you in the proper mood to write your memoirs.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Learn from successful examples.

Study the tactics of other Princes who have subverted democracies.

KARL LUEGER

There is an irony surrounding the expansion of male suffrage in Austria-Hungary in 1882. It led to the rise of the Christian Social Party, a right-wing populist party led by Karl Lueger.

Economic growth and development generated economic, demographic, cultural, and political stresses in Austria, especially Vienna. Vienna experienced rapid population growth as Slavs, Jews, and other non-German-speaking groups from the provinces and neighboring countries moved to Vienna. Vienna’s population increased from 551,000 in 1850 to 2,083,000 in 1910.

Lueger allied his party to existing conservative, reactionary and religious elements. The party appealed to clerical Catholicism, German nationalism, and traditional values. In Vienna, he appealed to a voting base of mostly German-speaking lower middle-class artisans and shopkeepers who were losing their economic security and status to immigrants and a rising liberal capitalist class. Mr. Lueger became very popular and was elected mayor of Vienna (1897-1910). As mayor, he initiated and managed new public works projects in Vienna that benefited his constituency. Eventually, he was accepted as an ally by the emperor and the aristocracy.

Mr. Lueger and the Christian Social Party used anti-Semitism as an effective political weapon. Karl Lueger did not create the populist anti-Semitism of Vienna but shrewdly exploited it for political gain.

The party advocated racist policies against non-German speaking minorities. It supported a bill to restrict immigration of Russian and Romanian Jews into Austria-Hungary. After World War I, the Christian Social Party morphed into a Fascist party that dominated Austrian politics until the Anschluss (union) with fascist Germany in 1938.

One person living in Vienna who watched and learned from the success of the political rhetoric of the Christian Social Party and the mass organizing techniques of Social Democrats was Adolph Hitler.

CAESAR AUGUSTUS

Brilliant use of propaganda and power to “hollow out” Rome’s republican institutions and destroy potential opposition, including half of the senators. Controlled all aspects of the government even though he had no official title. Always protested he was just trying to save the republic. Turned the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire.Turned Rome into an imperial city of marble.

MACHIAVELLI’S THE PRINCE

Don’s waste your time reading this book. Another time, another place. Princes were either born to power or killed rivals to get it. Ignore the book’s “how to” advice. You already know everything about getting and keeping power.

PLATO ON TYRANNY

Plato says that tyrants project anger, resentment, and revenge. (Books 8 and 9 of Plato’s Republic)

Tyrants exhibit hatred that springs from envy. They destroy good men (the just) because they have the virtues the tyrant lacks. Tyrants also go after the brave, the proud, the wise, the rich to boost their own stature and self-worth. All groups or organizations that contain people like this are potential enemies and must be corrupted.

October 10, 2025
American Colonial History, 1607-1775

Colonial Farm Kitchen. Notice clock in the corner.

THE 1600s

Preliminary Comments

About 350,000 Europeans emigrated to the American colonies in the 1600s. They were risk-takers. They left long-settled communities and societies to get on small, crowded sailing ships to make the dangerous 3,000 voyage to a new land that was mostly wilderness. About 5% died. They had to adapt to a new, frontier environment of forests and swamps. They had to “tame the howling wilderness.”

A high percent of the European immigrants in this period were from England. Almost all were Protestants.

Emigrants from England came over in three “waves.” Then a fourth ‘wave” came to the North American colonies in the 1700s. They were four distinctly different groups of people from different areas of the English isles.

To understand why these four groups left England and Scotland, at different times and for different reasons, it is necessary to know a little bit of English history during this period.

The Failure of the First Settlements

The earliest settlements of Pilgrims coming to Plymouth (1620) and immigrants coming to Jamestown (1607) were failures. About half of the Pilgrims died on the voyage or in the first year. Very few new immigrants came to Plymouth. The English Pilgrims actually came from Holland; they were worried that they were being assimilated into Dutch society.

The company that settled Jamestown continued to send over thousands of new immigrants and many supply ships. The first settlers were mostly single men looking for gold; only later did the Virginia Company send over families. In the first 15 years, about 75% of the settlers died. There were many reasons, including that Jamestown was built on a malarial swamp. Neither group was prepared to deal with the harsh “wilderness” of America.

But there was one success. Some of the Jamestown settlers began growing tobacco.

The First Wave – Puritans coming to the Boston area. (1629-1642)

English background. In the early 1600s, there was political tension and conflict in England. The English kings thought they could rule without consulting Parliament; Charles I suspended Parliament for eleven years. But many people in England thought the King and Parliament should rule together. They opposed the king’s right to rule without Parliament.

At the same time, there was a bitter conflict over who would control the Church of England. The Church of England was the official, government-supported church. It was Protestant (it was illegal to be a Catholic in England at this time). Most English were members. Some members wanted a church controlled by its bishops, who were appointed by the king. Top-down, hierarchical control. Others wanted to “reform” or “purify” the Church, move it further away from traditional practices and beliefs. Some even thought individual congregations should be able to appoint their ministers without interference from the bishops. These people were called Puritans.

The fights over who should control the government and who should control the Church of England were connected. Supporters of the king also supported a Church controlled by its leaders, the bishops. Many supporters of Parliament were also Puritans.

By the late 1620s, it was obvious that the king and the bishops had won the fight over power and control. Puritan ministers were being removed from their pulpits. Many Puritans recognized they had lost and wanted to leave England. They came to the American colonies.

From 1629 to 1642, 15,000-20,000 Puritans came to the Boston area and quickly spread out. Few new immigrants arrived in the rest of the 1600s, only about 7,000. This area was known as the Massachusetts Bay Colony. They were highly organized and well-prepared to set up towns and farms. They came in families, brought farm equipment and supplies, and their own Puritan ministers. They laid out towns and distributed land for family farms. They quickly set up a seminary to train new Puritan ministers; we now call this school Harvard. They prospered and their numbers increased rapidly. They spread out into much of New England and beyond.

They wanted to set up a Puritan society that they controlled. They discouraged anyone who wasn’t a Puritan from settling in New England. Non-Puritans were forced to deport and not return on threat of death. Four Quakers who came back were hung.

The Second Wave – Royalists coming to Virginia (1649-1660)

In 1642, civil war broke out in England – the Puritans and Parliament supporters against the king and his supporters. Supporters of the king were called royalists (also called cavaliers). Many were members of landowning aristocratic and gentry families.

The king and his supporters lost. The king was executed. Many royalists didn’t want to live under a government and church controlled by Parliament and Puritans. Some emigrated to the British West Indies and some to Virginia, where a pro-royalist governor created a stratified society dominated by royalists. He gave them large tracts of land, the basis of the spread of tobacco plantations.

They tried to recreate the kind of society and government they ruled before the civil war. Fortunately, there was hundreds of miles of wilderness between Virginia and Massachusetts.

About half of the European immigrants in the 1600s were poor people who couldn’t afford the ship passage to America. To get to America, they became “indenture servants.” Most came to Virginia and Maryland.

The tobacco growers owned great amounts of land but very few people to work it and process the tobacco. They encouraged “indentured servants” to come to Virginia. When the ships landed in America, the immigrants were auctioned off to pay the shipowners for passage. Typically, an indentured servant “agreed” to work for their owners for four to seven years. They had almost no rights. After their indenture was complete, they were free; some received some compensation. They were offered free or cheap land, so they had little reason to continue working on plantations. But since most of the good land along the rivers of Virginia was owned by earlier immigrants and their descendants, the new immigrants had to move west to the unsettled frontier, much of which were the foothills and valleys of the Appalachian Mountains. Tobacco growing spread rapidly and was by far the American colonies largest export in the 1600s and 1700s.

The Third Wave – Quakers coming to Pennsylvania (1680s and early 1700s)

Not everyone in England belonged to the official Church of England. They were called “dissenting sects.” One of the most prominent was the Quakers.

The Quakers were persecuted by government and church officials. In the 1680s, William Penn worked out a deal with the king, who granted Penn, who had converted to Quakerism, ownership and control over a large area in America in exchange for cancelling loans the king owed to the Penn family. Pennsylvania. It became a haven for Quakers. Many of the Quakers in England, over 20,000, emigrated to Pennsylvania and nearby areas. They established a society based on radical Quaker ideals. They were later joined by German sects with similar beliefs.

By the end of the 1600s, there were about 250,000 European immigrants and their descendants along the Atlantic coast. A very high percent, maybe 90% or more, were from England and Wales. Their numbers increased rapidly because of immigration and the high birth rates in New England.

FROM 1700 TO 1775 (THE FIRST YEAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION)

Immigration was different in the 1700s than in the 1600s. There were four main groups:

English – less than 100,000

Scots and Scots-Irish – about 150,00

German speaking – about 100,000

African slaves – about 250,000

Small numbers of other groups, including French Huguenots (Protestants) and Irish Catholics.

Total immigration in the 1700s was around 600,000 people. English immigrants were a minority of the European immigrants and a small minority of total immigrants. By 1775, the American colonies were made up of a diverse population; English immigrants and their descendants may have been a minority of the total population.

English Immigrants

The composition of English immigrants in the 1700s were somewhat different than that of English immigrants in the 1600s. They were not part of distinct religious or political groups. They were generally poor. They came from different parts of England, including the borderlands with Scotland. Many, maybe as many as 50,000, or over 50%, were criminals or convicts (in England, you could be sent to prison for not paying a debt). England emptied its jails and sent the inmates to America. Most ended up in Virginia and Maryland because that was where the ships were going, to pick up tobacco. The convicts were indentured for up to 14 years and did not get any land or compensation. They were treated no better than slaves. Most became part of the landless poor after their indenture was up. If they survived.

People from the borderlands between northern England and Scotland (1700s) and Highland Scotland

The Scots and Scots-Irish

Fighting between northern English and lowland Scots, and among Scottish clans, had been going on for hundreds of years. This was a frontier, lawless area – little organized government or military control. There was much violence, including raids to cause destruction, pillage, and steal cattle. In addition, there was family and clan feuds on the Scottish side of the border.

In the 1600s and 1700s, England completed its campaign of clearing out Irish Catholics from Northern Ireland. Favored English were given large land grants. Many of the farm workers came from Scotland. They were Protestant. They were called Scots-Irish.

In the 1700s, a stronger English government successfully established control over northern England. Through battles and brutal military campaigns, England subdued the lowland (borderland) Scots. Many didn’t like the new order. At the same time, highland Scot landowners began clearing out their tenant farmers, who became landless. Many Scots went to Northern Ireland to work. But conditions were not much better than in Scotland. In the 1700s, about 100,000 Scots and Scots-Irish emigrated to the American colonies.

Many of the settled colonies weren’t happy about the less “civilized” new immigrants. But the expanding plantation colonies of Virginia (tobacco) and South Carolina (rice) needed their labor.

Many of the borderland people and Highland Scots settled into a frontier environment in the foothills, valleys, and mountains of the Appalachian Mountains (the western geographical border of the colonies). Some Highland Scots settled in parts of North Carolina, a borderland region between Virginia and South Carolina. For a long time, there was little government or legal presence. Few churches and little organized religion. Disputes were often settled by violence. Many raised cattle as in the borderlands. In America, they were called the “backcountry” people.

German-Speaking Immigrants

Many of the German-speaking immigrants came to America to avoid religious persecution. They held similar religious beliefs as the Quakers. They also were persecuted by German governments and their official (state-supported) religions. When the Quakers established Pennsylvania, it was a safe haven for the German sects, including the German-speaking Amish, Mennonites, Moravians and Schwenkfelders. About three-quarters of the Germans landed in Philadelphia.

The German sects, like the Puritans and the Quakers, tended to come over as families and often with their ministers. They moved to the new lands west of the Quaker-dominated region around Philadelphia. Even today, part of their settlement is called the “Pennsylvania Dutch” country. The word “Dutch” is derived from the German word for Germans.

Because of the waves of Scot and German immigration, Pennsylvania’s population exploded from about 18,000 in 1700 to about 120,000 in 1750. The Quakers had become a minority in their own colony.

African Slaves

The largest colonial immigrant group was African slaves. About 250,000 African slaves were brought to the American colonies up to 1775. The number started to go up in the late 1600s and then accelerated after 1725. The total black population of colonial North America in 1775 was probably over 500,000, mostly slave but a small percent were free. Most of the slaves in the South worked on plantations, especially in Virginia, Maryland, South Carolina, and North Carolina.

Why were there African slavery in colonial America but not in England? There are demand side and supply reasons.

The short answer is: the rapid expansion of the production of plantation crops. The limiting growth factor, as always in colonial America, was labor. Expansion originally depended on indentured servants. But many immigrants, including indentured servants, didn’t want to work on plantations. German-speaking immigrants went to Pennsylvania, not Virginia, Maryland, or South Carolina. Many Scottish immigrants avoided indenture. Then there were the long-run costs. Indentured servants only worked for four to seven years. Plantation owners had to buy new servants to replace the freed servants. For complicated reasons, the number of immigrant indentured servants fell and the cost of rose in the late 1600s. African slaves cost more but they were slaves for life. In addition, children of slaves belonged to the slaveowner, a cheap source of future labor.

South Carolina was a special case. Plantation agriculture started when a few slaveowners and their slaves migrated from Barbados. Rice, not sugar, was the most profitable crop. Rice was exported to Europe and to Caribbean islands. By the late 1700s the rice growers in South Carolina were some of the richest families in America.

Slaves were available. The American continent was importing large number of slaves in the 1700s, mostly for the sugar-producing Caribbean islands and Brazil. Much of the trade to the Caribbean was controlled by English slavers. It was a short step to expand to the North American colonies. New England merchants and shipowners also entered the slave trade.

Native Americans

I have not mentioned Native Americans. There is currently much writing and discussion about Native Americans. It is a complicated topic. For the early relations between Native Americans and European immigrants, see Ken Burns’ documentary The American Revolution.

There were attempts to enslave Native Americans. The attempts failed.

In the end, unlike Spanish or Portuguese America, the rapid increase in the European population, combined with the pressure to expand farming into Native American lands with relatively small Native American populations, doomed Native American independence in parts of colonial and early Federalist America. Some tribes adapted. Some moved west. The Iroquois Confederation avoided most of the pressure and remained independent up to the American Revolution. But the long, tragic history of land-hungry white Americans taking Native American lands had begun.

CONSEQUENCES

Many of the European immigrants came to America to avoid religious and political persecution. Almost all early English immigrants had grievances against the English government when they emigrated. German-speaking immigrants had no ties with England. Many Scots hated the English. Equally important was the lure of unlimited new farmland. Rather than being tenant farmers (paying rent to a landowner) or landless farm laborers in Europe, immigrants had a chance to own large farms (by European standards) and be independent. For many, religious freedom and economic independence went together. For Africans, the exact opposite happened.

All groups had different ideas about how government, religion, and society should be organized. Or not organized. After the American Revolution, as the separate colonies became the United States, the clash of their different ideas would become the basis of many of America’s future political conflicts.

The rapid increase in the population of these groups and their westward expansion looking for new farmland would have a profound influence on American history. The first consequence was that the western movement to new lands was a contributing factor in causing the American Revolution.

AMERICA IN 1775

America in 1775 was a much different colony than the America of 100 years earlier. Population near the end of the 1600s of around 250,000 – almost all of English descent and few slaves – had become a society of about 2 million people in 1775 – about 1.5 million European immigrants and their descendants and about 500,000 African slaves. The white population had become more diverse and less English. The African slave population was around 25% of the total population.

With high birth rates, plentiful and diverse food, and open immigration, Americans could expect their population to double by 1800.

Why the change?

·      Access to “unlimited” free and cheap land for farming.

·      Geographic mobility – individuals, families and groups leaving settled communities to move west.

·      Fortunes to be made producing plantation crops and exporting into protected English markets (similar to the sugar islands in the Caribbean).

·      Expanding merchant and shipping class to handle rapidly expanding domestic and foreign trade.

·      Development of craft production to fill rapidly rising standards of living.

·      Overall opportunity – fewer obstacles to personal and family advancement than in England and Europe. Individual and political freedom and democratic government compared to Europe and even England.

The Economy

Almost all Americans, about 90%, engaged in agriculture. By 1775, about half of the white population owned their farms.

Agriculture by 1775 was very different than the subsistence (producing food just for the farm family) agriculture in most of the rest of the world. Americans with large family-owned farms and plantations, produced enough food to make Americans well-fed, plus a surplus of grain and commercial crops for sale to local markets, towns, and for export.

Americans produced a surprising variety of food and crops. For example, many farms and plantations had apple orchards. The apples were mostly used to produce cider. I was also astonished to learn that bananas were grown in South Carolina.

Americans had begun to experiment with growing mulberry trees throughout the colonies. Mulberry trees were the food for silkworms. Americans were trying to develop a silk industry. This venture would eventually fail. But many towns and rural areas even today have a Mulberry Street. Including Boston.

America’s largest exports in colonial times were the plantation crops of tobacco and rice, followed by indigo (a blue dye from the indigo plant for England’s growing textile industry). The colonies also exported grain and other products like lumber and horses to the sugar-producing islands in the Caribbean.

The American colonists imported most of their manufactured products from England. Everything from cloth, clothes, shoes, guns, swords, clocks, furniture, dinnerware, china (including Wedgwood), silverware and silver products, and all sorts of manufactured metal products including pots and shoe buckles. Wealthy planters imported luxury goods from England and Europe, imitating the wealthy landowning class of England. And tea.

The American colonies were England’s largest trading partner by 1775. While sugar from the West Indies was a more valuable English import than American tobacco, America with its large and growing population of prosperous farmers, planters, and merchants was a major market for English exports.

In the 1600s, almost all this trade was carried on English ships and controlled by English merchants. But by 1775, the American colonies had become major ship builders, about one-fourth of the total merchant ships of England and America. More of the trade with England was carried in American ships. And more of the trade was organized by a growing merchant class in American ports.

And by 1775, Americans were producing some of their own manufactured goods. Most farm families made cloth. American craftsmen were producing furniture, dinnerware, and silver products. The most famous silversmith was Paul Revere.

The colonial image above shows a farm family with metal pots and other metal goods, a gun over the mantel, metal buckles on man’s shoes, a butter churn (owned cows?), and a spinning wheel to make yarn. They also owned a grandfather clock. These products were of a simple style; other than the metal products, some of them were probably made in America. England would regret exporting rifles to America.

With seemingly unlimited land and a rapidly-growing population, rising exports, and new types of economic activity, the American economy was also rapidly growing and developing. On average, white Americans enjoyed a high average standard of living by 1775. Possibly the highest in the world.

Politics and Government

America was more democratic than England. No king, no aristocracy who dominated land-holding and political power. Much higher literacy rates. A much higher percent of white males voted and were active in local government than in England. America was almost entirely self-governing for almost 150 years before England attempted to tighten control in 1763.

Americans were highly literate; about 70% of white males and 50% of white females could read and write. The percents in Puritan New England were very high – about 90% for men and 80% for women. New England had its first printing press by 1640.

The literacy rates in England were much lower.

The American colonies had more newspapers than England, which had a larger population. Foreign observers often remarked that Americans seemed to love to read and talk about politics (often in taverns).

By 1775, over 50% of free adult males were qualified to vote. And Americans were very active voters, with high turn-outs at election times (free food and alcohol from the candidates helped raise turn-out rates). In England, by contrast, fewer then 5% of adult males were qualified to vote. In over half of parliamentary elections, there was only one candidate.

American colonies were self-governing. At both the local and provincial (colony) level, most of the government officials were democratically elected. The exception was that most of the provincial governors were appointed by London. But their salaries had to be approved by provincial assemblies, which gave them control over the governors.

One example of America’s independence from English control was that Americans found it easy to evade the Navigation Acts. The Navigation Acts basically said that most of American exports and imports had to be with England or English colonies. But Americans routinely ignored the Navigation Acts by trading with other countries and their colonies. Although illegal, Americans and American ships imported goods from other countries. England had too few officials and ships in America to stop this smuggling (sneaking in illegal imports). Probably the best-known smuggler was John Hancock.

England began to crack down on smuggling in 1763, after the end of the French and Indian War.

OVERVIEW

By 1775, the American colonies had become a rather unique society. It was very different than most of the rest of the world, even England. Large, family-owned farms. New land on the frontier. Commercially active. Literate. Democratic and politically engaged. Economic opportunity – few barriers to start new businesses or develop new skills (no guilds). Physical (move west) and economic mobility. King far away and no aristocratic landowning class. No long-settled rural class society. No large standing army. Low taxes approved by local governments.

One partial exception. By 1720, five colonies, and Westchester County in New York, had “established” religions, that is, religions supported by taxes. They were Congregational (Puritan) in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and Church of England (Anglican) in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. By 1775, other Protestant denominations, besides Quakerism, were flourishing, including Presbyterians (Scots), Baptists, Methodists, and German pietist sects. After 1740, America was swept by waves of evangelical enthusiasm.

By 1775, Europeans had become or were becoming Americans. England’s North American colony was less “English” and more diverse than a century earlier. Puritans were becoming Yankees; many were challenging their Puritan roots and moving away from the Boston area.  By the early 1700s, many New Englanders thought Harvard (established to train Puritan ministers and teachers), had become too “liberal.” Virginia royalists had become plantation owners, with African slaves replacing European indentured servants. England had virtually outlawed slavery in 1772 and was moving to stop the African slave trade. Many had gone from being Tories (supporters of king and aristocrats) to becoming Whigs (critics of king and his royal governors of Virginia) as they engaged in bitter political battles with appointed English governors and resented high tariffs imposed on their tobacco exports to England.

The Virginia planter class, somewhat unexpectedly given their backgrounds, would contribute many of the leaders, supporters and military officers in the coming American Revolution, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and James Monroe. And the father of Robert E. Lee.

Quakers came to America as a small persecuted religious group and had become the dominant merchant and political group in the greater Philadelphia regions. Maybe the Scots and Scots-Irish, relatively late arrivers, probably changed the least by 1775, but many hated the English for the brutal conquest of Scotland and already had a strong sense of personal independence.

The German-speaking farmers in Pennsylvania challenged the political monopoly of the Quakers and forced them to share political power.

There was individual mobility. The most famous example was Benjamin Franklin, who went from being a penniless “immigrant” from Boston to the richest man in Philadelphia. He was an urban entrepreneur and a major investor in urban real estate. An anglophile (lover of the English), he also went from a man who retired to England and expected to die there to be one of the leaders of American independence from England.

The Manigault family went from penniless religious refugees (French Huguenots) to the richest family in South Carolina in three generations. (They would be followed after the Revolution by the du Pont family, French political refugees.)

This was not a settled or stagnant society. By the standards of the time, colonial America was a “modern” society. The main threat to dynamic change and growth was that America was still an English colony. That would change.

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See the next post in this series,

The American Revolution and the New Country: American History, 1755-1790

followed by

A New Nation, America from 1789 to 1860

The classic book on colonial America is Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America, a 1989 book by David Hackett Fischer. Long, incredibly detailed about all aspects of colonial American life. If you get through the entire book (last section optional), you should consider becoming an American History major.

For an excellent survey of colonial America and the other colonies in North America, see Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America, 2001.

For a discussion of how the North American and West Indies colonies fit into the wider English imperial empire that began in the 1600s, see

England in the 1600s: The Beginning of England’s Rise to Global Power and Wealth

This essay includes a discussion about how the American colonies fit into the English imperial system, especially the Navigation Acts.

September 25, 2025

Author: Bennett Greenberg

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